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Introducción 
 
La teoría de agencia ha dominado el análisis del gobierno de la empresa desde Berle y 
Means (1932). Esta teoría estudia la separación entre propiedad y control, y la posibilidad 
de que los gerentes (agentes) tomen decisiones en contra de los intereses de los accionistas 
(principales). Por ejemplo, los ejecutivos pueden acumular beneficios privados 
construyendo imperios, fijándose salarios desorbitados, realizando transferencias entre 
empresas afiliadas a precios fuera de mercado, o esforzándose menos de lo necesario. 
En este contexto, el gobierno de la empresa está ideado para alinear los intereses de 
los directivos y los de los accionistas. Un buen gobierno de la empresa es aquel que 
selecciona los gerentes más capaces y los responsabiliza frente a los inversores. Existen 
diferentes mecanismos de gobierno que se pueden utilizar para lograr que los gerentes no 
expropien a los accionistas. Estos mecanismos se clasifican en internos o externos. Los 
mecanismos internos hacen referencia a la organización interna de la empresa, como la 
independencia del consejo de administración, la presencia de accionistas mayoritarios, y los 
mecanismos de remuneración de los directivos. Los mecanismos externos son aquellos que 
se basan en el control ejercido por el mercado de capitales, como las adquisiciones de 
empresas y el mercado de capitales. 
El gobierno de la empresa usa estados financieros (estados contables) como parte del 
sistema de información. A través de los estados financieros, los accionistas son capaces de 
evaluar el comportamiento de los directivos y pueden confirmar sus expectativas sobre los 
resultados de la gestión de los ejecutivos. Si las expectativas sobre el trabajo realizado por 
los directivos son desatendidas, los accionistas pueden tomar medidas disciplinarias que 
afecten al bienestar de los gerentes en términos de desarrollo de su carrera profesional, de 
remuneración, o de reputación. 
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Dado el papel fundamental de la información contable para disciplinar el 
comportamiento de los gerentes, no es sorprendente que éstos traten de manipular los 
estados financieros para lograr sus propios beneficios, a la vez que tratan de satisfacer a los 
accionistas. De esta manera, los ejecutivos lograrían comportarse de forma oportunista y, a 
la vez, satisfacer las expectativas de los accionistas, al menos sobre el papel. En esta tesis, 
se estudian diferentes maneras a través de las cuales los gerentes pueden distorsionar la 
información de los estados financieros. En primer lugar, los ejecutivos pueden alisar los 
beneficios eligiendo de manera oportunista el momento de reconocimiento de ingresos y 
gastos. En segundo lugar, se considera el uso oportunista de los devengos, que se basan en 
supuestos y estimaciones que se pueden aplicar de manera oportunista para confundir a los 
usuarios de los estados financieros. Por último, se estudia la manipulación de las 
actividades reales, que afecta el curso normal de las operaciones de empresa. Por ejemplo, 
para crear un volumen adicional de ventas, los ejecutivos pueden ofrecer condiciones de 
crédito más favorables al final del año fiscal. 
En los tres capítulos centrales de esta tesis, se estudia cómo el gobierno de la 
empresa, en lugar de reducir el problema de agencia alineando los intereses de los 
directivos con los de los accionistas, puede amplificar el problema llevando a los ejecutivos 
a manipular la información contable. En el primer capítulo, titulado "Overinvestment, 
subsequent earnings management, and CEO vulnerability", se analiza un ejemplo clásico 
de acciones tomadas por los gerentes en contra de los intereses de los accionistas: las 
ineficiencias de inversión. Una inversión es eficiente y debe llevarse a cabo cuando su 
valor actual neto es positivo. En ocasiones, los gerentes prefieren sobreinvertir, es decir, 
invertir más allá del nivel óptimo, en contra de los objetivos de los accionistas. Aunque la 
información contable ayuda a las partes interesadas a supervisar la gestión y el rendimiento 
de las inversiones, en este capítulo se argumenta que los ejecutivos invierten demasiado y 
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esconden esta ineficiencia a los accionistas mediante la introducción de sesgos en la 
información contable a través de los devengos y de la manipulación de ventas. También se 
analizan los objetivos particulares que los gerentes pueden conseguir sobreinvirtiendo de 
forma oportunista. Debido a que el exceso de inversión hace que el reemplazo de los 
gerentes sea más costoso y que la empresa sea menos atractiva para una potencial 
adquisición, se plantea la hipótesis que los gerentes que se encuentran en una situación más 
vulnerable en su puesto de trabajo son más proclives a la sobreinversión para asegurar su 
puesto de trabajo en el futuro. 
El segundo capítulo, titulado "Entrenched managers’ usage of earnings management 
tools", tiene el objetivo de evaluar una manifestación del problema de agencia: el 
atrincheramiento de los gerentes. El atrincheramiento tiene lugar cuando los gerentes 
maximizan su bienestar personal sin experimentar la disciplina del gobierno corporativo y 
de los mecanismos de control. Los gerentes se pueden atrincherar de distintas formas, 
como a través de mecanismos que limitan la posibilidad de que la empresa sea adquirida 
por un tercero. El atrincheramiento de los gerentes se ha considerado en la literatura sobre 
el gobierno de la empresa como una de las manifestaciones más costosas del problema de 
agencia, ya que reduce la probabilidad de ofertas públicas de adquisición (OPAs) hostiles y 
conduce a una asignación ineficiente de los recursos de la empresa. Sin embargo, en la tesis 
se sostiene que el atrincheramiento reduce la "miopía" de los gerentes. Cuando los gerentes 
están sujetos a la presión del mercado de capitales, tienden a centrarse en el rendimiento a 
corto plazo, más que en inversiones de mayor riesgo con rendimiento a largo plazo. Por el 
contrario, los gerentes atrincherados sienten menor presión por parte de los mercados de 
capital y, por ello, pueden dirigir su atención hacia objetivos a largo plazo. Por esta razón, 
se propone que los ejecutivos atrincherados son menos proclives a distorsionar la 
información contable a través de los devengos y de la manipulación de actividades reales, 
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que normalmente se utilizan para lograr objetivos a corto plazo a costa de los objetivos a 
largo plazo. Por otra parte, dado que el alisamiento de los beneficios se puede utilizar para 
satisfacer objetivos a largo plazo, como una disminución del coste de capital y del coste de 
la deuda, en este capítulo se prevé que los gerentes atrincherados tienden a alisar los 
beneficios. Finalmente, debido a que los gerentes atrincherados son los que menos 
distorsionan la información contable a través de los devengos y de la manipulación de 
actividades reales, que son perjudiciales para el rendimiento operativo futuro de la 
empresa, se espera que el atrincheramiento tenga una asociación positiva con los resultados 
operativos de la empresa en los siguientes años. 
En el tercer capítulo, titulado "Compensation mechanisms, accounting choice, and 
real activities manipulation", se analiza cómo los mecanismos de compensación, 
inicialmente introducidos para resolver el conflicto de agencia entre gerente y accionista, y 
que normalmente vinculan la remuneración del gerente a los resultados de empresa, pueden 
tener el efecto contrario, amplificando los problemas de agencia. Aunque estudios 
anteriores ya se han centrado en la relación entre algunos mecanismos de compensación de 
los ejecutivos y la calidad de los devengos, en este capítulo se argumenta que los 
mecanismos de compensación, como las opciones sobre acciones, los bonos anuales, los 
planes de incentivos a largo plazo, las acciones y las acciones restringidas, tienen 
características que llevan a los ejecutivos a manipular no sólo las cifras contables (por 
ejemplo, a través del alisamiento de beneficios y del uso oportunista de los devengos), sino 
también las actividades reales (es decir, a través de la manipulación de las ventas). Por lo 
tanto, los mecanismos de compensación pueden ser perjudiciales no sólo para la 
información contable, sino también para el valor futuro de la empresa, como consecuencia 
de una reducción en los flujos futuros de caja. 
 11 
 
Chapter 1 – Introduction 
 
Agency theory has dominated the analysis of corporate governance since Berle and 
Means (1932). Its main concern is the separation of ownership and control, and the 
possibility that managers (agents) take actions that hurt shareholders (principals). Chief 
Executive Officers (CEOs) may amass private benefits by building empires, maintaining 
costly labour, paying inflated transfer prices to affiliated companies, or spending 
insufficient effort in their job. 
In this context, corporate governance is expected to align the interests of managers to 
those of shareholders. Accordingly, a strong corporate governance is “the one that selects 
the most able managers and makes them accountable to investors” (Tirole, 2001: 2). There 
are different corporate governance mechanisms that can be used to force agents to 
internalize the welfare of shareholders. These mechanisms are classified as either internal 
or external. Internal corporate governance refers to the organization of firms, such as the 
independence of the board of directors, the presence of blockholders, and the structure of 
managerial compensation mechanisms. External corporate governance consists in market-
based control mechanisms, such as takeovers and the market for corporate control. 
Corporate governance uses financial reporting as a part of the corporate information 
system. Through the information in the financial reports, shareholders are able to assess 
managers’ behavior and to confirm their expectations about the results of managerial 
choices. If principals’ expectations are unattended, shareholders take disciplinary actions 
that are likely to affect managerial welfare via career concerns, managerial compensation, 
or managerial reputation. 
Given that accounting is used by shareholders to monitor managerial actions, there is 
evidence that managers manipulate the financial reports to mislead shareholders about 
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managerial opportunistic behaviors. In this thesis, I consider different ways through which 
managers may distort accounting information. First, CEOs can engage in income 
smoothing, which is the process of manipulating the time profile of earnings to make the 
reported income stream less variable. Second, I consider the opportunistic use of accruals. 
Accruals are based on assumptions and estimates that can be managed opportunistically to 
mislead users of financial statements. Finally, I study CEOs’ real activities manipulation, 
which affects the normal course of operational activities. For example, to create additional 
sales volume, CEOs can offer more lenient credit terms at the end of fiscal year. 
In the three empirical essays of this thesis, I analyze CEOs’ opportunistic behaviors 
and how corporate governance, instead of reducing the agency problem by aligning 
managers’ interests with those of shareholders, may amplify it by leading CEOs to 
manipulate accounting information. In the first essay, titled “Overinvestment, subsequent 
earnings management, and CEO vulnerability”, I analyze a typical manifestation of CEOs’ 
behavior against shareholders’ interests: The case of investment inefficiencies. An 
investment is efficient and should be undertaken when its net present value is greater than 
zero. Managers are sometimes inclined to overinvest, that is, to invest beyond the optimal 
level, in contrast with shareholders’ objectives. Although financial reporting helps 
stakeholders to monitor managerial behavior and investment returns, I argue that CEOs 
overinvest and make shareholders believe they are investing properly by introducing bias 
into accounting measures through the opportunistic use of accruals and through sales 
manipulation. I also analyze private objectives that CEOs are likely to achieve by 
overinvesting opportunistically. Because overinvestment makes managerial replacement 
more costly and firms less attractive for a potential takeover, I hypothesize that vulnerable 
managers are likely to overinvest to ensure their job position in the future. 
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The second essay, titled “Entrenched managers’ usage of earnings management 
tools”, is aimed at analyzing a manifestation of the agency problem: Managerial 
entrenchment. Managerial entrenchment can be defined as managers maximizing their 
personal welfare without experiencing discipline from corporate governance and control 
mechanisms, for example through the implementation of anti-takeover provisions. CEOs’ 
entrenchment has been seen in the corporate governance literature as one of the costliest 
manifestation of the agency problem, as it reduces the probability of takeovers and leads to 
an inefficient allocation of firm’s resources. However, I argue that managerial 
entrenchment reduces CEOs’ “myopia”. When managers are subject to the pressure of the 
capital market, they usually focus on short-term performance, rather than on riskier long-
term investments. On the contrary, entrenched CEOs feel less pressure from capital 
markets and, thus, direct their attention to long-term objectives. For this reason, I argue that 
entrenched CEOs are less likely to distort financial reporting information through 
discretionary accruals and real activities manipulation, which are normally used to achieve 
short-term objectives at the expense of long-term goals. On the other hand, given that 
income smoothing can be used to satisfy long-term objectives, like a decrease of both cost 
of equity and cost of debt, I hypothesize that entrenched managers are likely to engage in 
income smoothing. Finally, because entrenched CEOs are less expected to distort financial 
reporting through discretionary accruals and real activities manipulation, which are 
detrimental to future operating performance, I argue that managerial entrenchment is 
positively related to subsequent firm operating performance. 
Finally, in the third essay, titled “Compensation mechanisms, accounting choice, and 
real activities manipulation”, I analyze managerial compensation mechanisms. Initially, 
managerial compensation mechanisms were designed to solve the agency conflict between 
managers and shareholders, as they normally link CEOs’ remuneration to firm 
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performance. However, these compensation mechanisms may have the opposite effect, 
amplifying agency problems. Although previous studies have already focused on the 
relation between some compensation mechanisms and accruals quality, I argue that 
compensation mechanisms, such as stock options, annual bonuses, long-term incentive 
plans, equity stocks, and restricted stock grants, have characteristics that lead CEOs to 
manipulate not only accounting numbers (i.e., through income smoothing and discretionary 
accruals), but also real activities (i.e., through sales manipulation). As a consequence, 
compensation mechanisms can be detrimental not only to the informativeness of earnings, 
but also to future firm value, through a reduction in future cash flows. 
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Chapter 2 - Overinvestment, Subsequent Earnings Management, and CEO 
Vulnerability 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Financial reporting is considered to be a powerful tool at the service of 
shareholders to limit the problem of overinvestment in which managers may 
incur to pursue their own interests. In this context, we argue that CEOs that 
overinvest subsequently distort financial reporting information to keep up with 
stakeholders’ expectations about investment returns. Also, because 
overinvestment has the effect of both making managerial replacement more 
costly and decreasing the attractiveness of firms for a potential takeover, we 
hypothesize that vulnerable CEOs are likely to overinvest to ensure their job 
position in the future. Results suggest that CEOs’ overinvestment is positively 
associated with earnings management, measured through both discretionary 
accruals and sales manipulation. Empirical tests also indicate that managers use 
more intensively discretionary accruals to hide overinvestment to stakeholders 
if investments are more difficult to be monitored, as in the case of capital 
expenditures and R&D expenses. Finally, our tests show that less vulnerable 
CEOs are likely to have engaged in overinvestment in the previous period, 
suggesting that overinvestment is likely to ensure managerial position in the 
future. 
 
 
 
2.1. Introduction 
According to the agency theory, managers are likely to choose actions that maximize 
their own welfare, rather than shareholders’ welfare (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). To avoid 
CEOs’ opportunistic behaviours, stakeholders use financial reporting as a part of the 
corporate information system (Watts and Zimmerman, 1983; Watts, 2003). Through 
financial reporting information, stakeholders are able to monitor their expectations about 
the results of managerial choices. If principals’ expectations are unattended, shareholders 
take disciplinary actions that are likely to affect managerial welfare via career concerns, 
managerial compensation, or managerial reputation (Watts, 2003). 
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An example of CEOs’ opportunistic behaviour is represented by investment 
inefficiencies. Managers are sometimes inclined to make investments that are not efficient, 
that is, that are not able to generate a net present value greater than zero (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1986). In particular, CEOs tend to overinvest, that is, to invest beyond the 
optimal level (Shleifer and Visnhy, 1989), either to achieve personal benefits, such as an 
increase of resources under their control or an increase in their prestige (Stulz, 1990), or 
because they are overconfident about their abilities (Malmendier and Tate, 2005). Also in 
the case of overinvestment, financial reporting can play an important role in constraining 
the opportunistic behaviour of CEOs by helping stakeholders monitor investment returns 
(Biddle and Hilary, 2006; Verdi, 2006; Biddle et al., 2009; Francis and Martin, 2010). The 
authors observe that financial reporting quality reduces investment inefficiencies (Biddle 
and Hilary, 2006; Verdi, 2006; Biddle et al., 2009), and that conservative accounting 
policies, as part of the corporate control structure, lead CEOs to make more profitable 
investments, such as acquisitions and divesture decisions (Francis and Martin, 2010). 
To avoid a decrease of their welfare, managers can introduce bias into accounting 
measures. There are different ways to manipulate firm financial performance. One of the 
most studied ways in previous literature is the unexpected components of accruals (among 
others, Jones, 1991; Dechow et al., 1998). Accrual accounting is defined as “the accrual 
and deferral of past, current and anticipated future cash receipts and disbursements” 
(Richardson et al., 2005: 441). Accruals are subject to assumptions and estimates and can 
be manipulated to mislead users of financial statements. An opportunistic usage of 
discretionary accruals has the effect of making earnings less informative, but it also has the 
effect of decreasing subsequent earnings due to their reversal effect. Another way to distort 
firm financial information is to manipulate normal operational practices. According to a 
survey conducted by Graham et al. (2005), executives are willing to burn cash flows 
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through the manipulation of real activities to meet stakeholders’ expectations. 
Roychowdhury (2006), for example, observes that managers can create additional sales 
volume by offering more lenient credit terms, such as lower (or even zero) interest rates, at 
the end of the fiscal year. Sales manipulation leads to lower operating cash flows (CFOs) 
and, thus, to lower future operating performance. We then expect a positive association 
between CEOs’ overinvestment and both discretionary accruals and sales manipulation to 
avoid stakeholders realizing investment inefficiencies and, thus, a decrease in managerial 
welfare. 
We also analyze private objectives that CEOs are likely to gain by opportunistically 
overinvesting. According to Fredrickson et al. (1988), the first years of CEOs’ tenure 
coincide with a period of extreme vulnerability. In fact, new CEOs are closely monitored 
by boards and stakeholders and they need time to show their competitive advantage inside 
their firms (Shen, 2003). Such an early vulnerability is reflected in the high number of 
CEOs whose tenure lasts less than three years (Fredrickson et al., 1988). Overinvestment 
can help managers to strengthen their positions and, thus, to become less vulnerable in the 
future. Shleifer and Vishny (1989) argue that managers tend to invest firms’ resources in 
assets that are not value-maximizing for shareholders, but that are able to reduce the 
probability of managerial replacement. For example, CEOs can overinvest free cash flow in 
an asset if they represent the best person to run it, even if the value-maximizing choice for 
shareholders would be distributing free cash flow as dividends (Shleifer and Vishny, 1989). 
Also, overinvestment is likely to increase current stock price (McConnell and Muscarella, 
1985) and to decrease future firm value (Jensen, 1986), making firm less attractive for a 
potential takeover and, thus, further ensuring managerial job position. Thus, we argue that 
vulnerable CEOs are likely to overinvest to make their position inside firms less vulnerable 
in the future. 
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We test these contentions using a US sample for the period 1992-2006. We collect 
accounting data from Compustat and corporate governance characteristics from 
Execucomp. The final sample consists of 6,424 firm-year observations corresponding 
1,332 different firms. 
We find that overinvesting CEOs are likely to opportunistically use both discretionary 
accruals and sales manipulation. The magnitude of the positive association between 
overinvestment and earnings management becomes stronger when we exclude from our 
definition of investment items that are easy to monitor, such as acquisitions. In fact, if 
investment returns are difficult to monitor (like in the case of capital expenditures and 
R&D expenses), it is more effective for managers to mask investment inefficiencies 
through earnings management. We also show that firms having ex-ante conditions to 
overinvest, such as high cash and low leverage, are still likely to distort financial 
accounting information through the manipulation of accounting numbers. 
Finally, we test whether vulnerable CEOs engage in overinvestment to decrease their 
vulnerability in the future. By measuring vulnerability through CEO tenure, as longer 
tenure corresponds to less vulnerability (Fredrickson et al., 1988), results support the idea 
that overinvestment decreases managerial vulnerability in the future. The tests we conduct 
are robust to all the proxies of overinvestment used in this paper. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we develop the 
testable hypotheses. In Section 3 we describe the data, define the variables and present the 
research methods. Section 4 contains the results. Finally, Section 5 concludes. 
 
2.2. Overinvestment, earnings management, and CEOs’ personal objectives 
In this section, we develop hypotheses about the associations between overinvestment 
and both discretionary accruals and sales manipulation. Furthermore, we analyze CEOs’ 
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opportunistic behavior in using overinvestment as a tool to decrease their vulnerability in 
the future. 
 
2.2.1. Earnings management to cover investment inefficiencies 
An investment is efficient and should be undertaken in the interest of shareholders 
when its net present value is greater than zero. However, “managers have incentives to 
cause their firms to grow beyond the optimal size” (Jensen, 1986: 323). For example, a 
CEO with greater experience in the marketing field is more likely to implement further 
strategies and investments focused on brand developments to make his or her replacement 
more costly, even if such strategies have a negative net present value (Shleifer and Vishny, 
1989). The inefficient use of firm resources can lead to poor selection of investment 
projects, including financing projects with ex-ante negative net present values and, thus, to 
a disappointment of stakeholders’ expectations. 
CEOs tend to overinvest, that is, to invest beyond the optimal level, either because they 
are overconfident about themselves and the return of their investment projects (Malmendier 
and Tate, 2005; Ben-David et al., 2007; Schrand and Zechman, 2007), or to achieve private 
objectives, in contrast with stakeholders’ interests. For example, by overinvesting, 
managers increase resources under their control, possibly increasing their prestige (Stulz, 
1990), and, eventually, also their compensation (Murphy, 1999).  
It is commonly accepted that financial reporting is part of the information system of 
firms, and that it helps mitigate information asymmetries (e.g., Holmstrom and Tirole, 
1993; Bushman and Smith, 2001) as it provides to stakeholders information about 
managerial investment decisions. Previous literature, for example, observes that higher 
quality of accounting information leads to better bidding decision in acquisitions 
(McNichols and Stubben, 2010), and that more detailed geographic disclosure leads to less 
 20 
 
aggressive and more profitable growth of firms (Hope and Thomas, 2007). Also, recent 
literature (Verdi, 2006; Hope and Thomas, 2008; Biddle et al., 2009; Francis and Martin, 
2010) argues that higher financial reporting quality is likely to increase investment 
efficiency due to the enhanced monitoring tool provided to stakeholders. 
In this paper, we argue that overinvestment leads to earnings management to cover 
investment inefficiencies to stakeholders. Given the financial reporting system as source of 
information, CEOs can still conceal their inefficient investment behavior by engaging in 
earnings management. We hypothesize that CEOs engaging in overinvestment are likely to 
engage also in discretionary accruals. As accruals are based on assumptions and estimates, 
they can be opportunistically managed to mislead users of financial statements (Jones, 
1991; Dechow and Dichev, 2002) about CEOs’ usage of firms’ resources that have not 
been distributed among shareholders. 
To keep up with stakeholders’ expectations, not only can CEOs opportunistically use 
discretionary accruals, but they can also artificially increase sales (Roychowdhury, 2006; 
Cohen and Zarowin, 2010). For example, sales can be manipulated by offering more 
lenient credit terms. In this way, sales volume increases, but also credit risk. The effect of 
sales manipulation is to inflate current earnings. However, it affects future cash flows and, 
thus, long-term firm value (Roychowdhury, 2006). Our first hypothesis states that CEOs 
overinvest and, then, distort financial reporting information through both discretionary 
accruals and sales manipulation. 
 
H1: CEOs engaging in overinvestment are likely to manipulate financial 
reporting information through both discretionary accruals and sales 
manipulation. 
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2.2.2. Overinvestment and CEO vulnerability 
Hypothesis 1 suggests that CEOs are willing to engage in overinvestment and to cover 
it through both discretionary accruals and sales manipulation to achieve private objectives. 
We argue that CEOs are likely to employ an excessive amount of firm resources to 
decrease their vulnerability, that is, to decrease the risk perceived by CEOs about their job 
position. 
Investment inefficiencies have an effect both on managerial position inside the firm, 
and on the market value of the firm (Morck et al., 1990). Shleifer and Vishny (1989) use 
the example of manager-specific investments to show how excessive investments can 
consolidate CEOs’ position inside firms. Manager-specific investments are those 
investments that are most valuable under the current manager. If manager-specific 
investments are also irreversible, they make CEOs’ replacement more costly. By using 
firms’ resources to engage in excessive amounts of manager-specific investments, 
managers “bind shareholders to themselves” (Shleifer and Vishny, 1989: 124). 
With regards to the effect that investment inefficiency has on the market value of firms, 
McConnell and Muscarella (1985) find that stock prices react positively to announcements 
of greater investment expenditures and negatively to decreased expenditures. However, on 
the long-run, overinvestment is likely to have negative effects on firm value. Jensen (1986), 
for example, argues that managers with low debt overhang problem and large free cash 
flows, which are those that are more likely to overinvest, tend to undertake value-
decreasing investments. Also, Stultz (1990) observes that very diversified firms are likely 
to invest too many resources in poor investment opportunities. Because overinvestment is 
expected to increase current share value and to decrease future firm value, it decreases 
firms’ attractiveness to a potential buyer and, thus, the probability of takeovers. As a result, 
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overinvestment is likely to make CEOs less vulnerable. Thus, we expect that CEOs engage 
in overinvestment to make themselves less vulnerable in the future. 
 
H2: Overinvestment is likely to reduce CEOs’ vulnerability in the future. 
 
2.3. Data, variable definitions, and research methods 
2.3.1. Data 
We collect financial accounting data from the Compustat annual industrial and research 
files, excluding firms in regulated industries (SIC codes between 4400 and 5000), and 
financial institutions (SIC codes between 6000 and 6500). We also require that each firm-
year observation has the data necessary to calculate investment inefficiencies, discretionary 
accruals, and sales manipulation. Data about corporate governance characteristics are taken 
from the Compustat Executive Compensation (ExecuComp) dataset. These data are 
available only starting from 1992. We winsorize variables at 1% and 99% as it is common 
to avoid outliers blurring the results. The final sample of US firms consists of 6,424 firm-
year observation and of 1,332 different firms from 1992 to 2006. 
 
2.3.2. Earnings management measures 
To test the hypothesis about the effects that overinvestment has on manipulation of 
firm performance, we separately estimate two earnings management tools: Discretionary 
accruals and sales manipulation. 
Discretionary accruals are the firm-specific discretionary portion of total accruals. We 
construct two proxies to estimate discretionary accruals. As a first proxy, we apply the 
modified Jones model (Dechow et al., 1995). This model is based on the popular Jones 
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(1991) model, which estimates total accruals cross-sectionally for all the industry-year 
combinations as follows: 
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where TACCit represents total accruals, calculated as the difference between net income 
before extraordinary items and cash flows from operations (annual Compustat data item 
#18 – annual Compustat data item #308), Ait are total assets (annual Compustat data item 
#6), ∆REVit is the change in net sales (annual Compustat data item #12), and PPEit is gross 
property, plant and equipment (annual Compustat data item #7). The estimation is run for 
all firms in each industry i and for each year t. In the Jones model, discretionary accruals 
are the residuals from Equation (1). However, Dechow et al. (1995) observe that the Jones 
model implies that revenues are non-discretionary. The authors observe that, at the end of 
the year, managers could use discretion to accrue revenues not only when cash has not been 
received yet, but also when it is highly questionable whether revenues can be actually 
realized. In the modified Jones model, Dechow et al. (1995) attempt to eliminate this bias, 
consisting in measuring discretionary accruals without taking into account the discretion 
CEOs possibly exercise over revenues. According to this model, once we run Equation (1), 
we compute the residuals as follows: 
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The only difference with the Jones model is that changes in revenues are adjusted for the 
change in accounting receivable (∆ARit) (annual Compustat data item #2) in the event 
period. The signed values from the model of Dechow et al. (1995) represent our first proxy 
for discretionary accruals (DA1). 
We use an alternative measure of discretionary accruals that controls for firm 
performance, as it is likely to influence the association between overinvestment and 
earnings management (Kothari et al., 2005). One means for controlling for the level of firm 
performance is to expand the determinants of total accruals in Equation (1) by including 
ROA, computed as the ratio of income before extraordinary items (annual Compustat data 
item #18) to beginning total assets (annual Compustat data item #6), as a determinant of 
total accruals. In our tests, we refer to this performance-adjusted discretionary accruals 
model as DA2. 
Our proxy for sales manipulation (SM) is based on the methodology presented by 
Dechow et al. (1998) and Roychowdhury (2006). We start from the definition of normal 
cash flow from operations, which can be considered as a linear function of sales and 
changes in sales for the current period: 
 
it
ti
tiit
ti
it
titi
it
A
SS
A
S
AA
CFO
εββαα +





 −
+







+







+=
−
−
−−− 1,
1,
2
1,
1
1,
10
1,
1
   (3) 
 
where CFO is cash flow from operations (annual Compustat data item #308), A is total 
assets (annual Compustat data item #6), and S is sales (annual Compustat data item #12). 
This model is estimated for each year t and for every industry classified by its 2-digit SIC 
code. Roychowdhury (2006) computes her proxy for sales manipulation as the residuals 
from Equation (3). However, residuals from Equation (3) are also likely to capture the 
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effects of the manipulation of discretionary expenses, which could be influenced by CEOs 
engagement in overinvestment. In fact, the portion of overinvestment referred to 
discretionary expenses has the effect of decreasing current CFOs. To disentangle 
overinvestment from sales manipulation, we first compute discretionary expenses as the 
sum of advertising expenses (annual Compustat data item #45), R&D expenses (annual 
Compustat data item #46), and selling, general, and administrative (SG&A) expenses 
(annual Compustat data item #189) 1. We then compute the medians by year and by sector 
of discretionary expenses divided by beginning total assets and then calculate the 
difference between the medians and the actual values of discretionary expenses, scaled by 
beginning total assets. To run Equation (3), we add this difference to CFOs scaled by 
beginning total assets. Finally, because the smaller the residuals, the higher the 
manipulation of sales, we multiply the residuals by (-1) for clearer interpretations. 
 
2.3.3. CEO vulnerability measure 
We base our proxy for CEO vulnerability on CEO tenure. A reduction of managerial 
vulnerability inside the firm implies an increase of CEO tenure beyond a level in which 
managerial position becomes stronger (Shen, 2003). Fredrickson et al. (1988) argue that 
early vulnerability occurs when CEO tenure is less than, or equal to, three years. After three 
years, CEOs start gaining power. We then construct a dummy variable taking the value of 1 
if CEO tenure is greater than 3, and 0 otherwise. 
 
2.3.4. Overinvestment measures 
                                                          
1
 If SG&A expenses are available, advertinsing and R&D expenses are set equal to zero if missing. 
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We construct three proxies for overinvestment. First, we estimate investments at time t 
following Richardson (2006) and Verdi (2006). In this model, investments are estimated as 
follows: 
 
ittiit QfullInvestment εββ ++= −1,10_        (4) 
 
The model is computed by year and by sector. As in Verdi (2006), Investment_full is the 
sum of capital expenditures (annual Compustat data item #128), R&D expenditures 
(annual Compustat data item #46), and acquisitions (annual Compustat data item #129), 
minus sales of PPE (annual Compustat data item #107) and depreciation and amortization 
(annual Compustat data item #125), multiplied by 100, and divided by beginning total 
assets (annual Compustat data item #6). Q is Tobin’s Q (Tobin, 1982), computed as the 
ratio of the market value of total assets to the book value of total assets. The market value 
of total assets is defined as total assets (annual Compustat data item #6), plus the product 
of stock price (annual Compustat data item #199) and the number of common shares 
outstanding (annual Compustat data item #25), minus the book value of equity (annual 
Compustat data item #60), all divided by beginning total assets (annual Compustat data 
item #6). Then, we compute the residuals (Inv_efficiency_full) from Equation (4). Negative 
residuals represent underinvestment, and positive residuals represent overinvestment. We 
sort all the residuals (positive and negative) from Equation (4) in quartiles. Finally, we 
construct a variable (Overinvestment_full) that takes the value of 0 if firms have residuals 
included in the second and third quartile (the benchmark group, representing firms 
investing at a normal level, compared to other firms in the same year and sector); -1 if 
firms have residuals that fall in the first quartile (underinvestment group); and 1 if firms 
have residuals included in the fourth quartile (overinvestment group) (Biddle et al., 2009). 
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In Equation (4), Investment_full includes capital expenditures, R&D expenditures, and 
acquisitions. Among these three items, acquisitions represent the expenditure that provides 
more verifiable results. We expect that, by including in the definition of Investment only 
capital expenditures and R&D expenditures (Investment_partial), the association between 
overinvestment and earnings management becomes stronger. In fact, both capital 
expenditures and R&D expenses are difficult to be monitored. As they are less verifiable, 
CEOs can more easily mask the correspondent investment inefficiencies through earnings 
management. Thus, the second overinvestment proxy (Overinvestment_partial) is a 
discrete variable that takes the values from (-1) to 1, depending on the residuals from 
investment levels, defined without considering acquisitions. 
The last proxy of overinvestment is based on ex-ante firm-specific characteristics that 
make managers more likely to engage in overinvestment. Following Biddle et al. (2009), 
firms with high cash balance and low leverage have more available liquidity and less 
financial constrains. These characteristics make overinvestment an available option. We 
first rank firms into deciles of both cash balance, defined as cash and marketable securities 
(annual Compustat data item #162), over total assets (annual Compustat data item #6) less 
cash and marketable securities (Opler et al., 1999; Biddle et al., 2009), and the reciprocal 
of leverage, computed as the ratio between total liabilities (annual Compustat data item 
#181) and total assets (annual Compustat data item #6). Then, we re-scale the deciles from 
0 to 1, and construct a composite measure (Overfirm) that is the average of the re-scaled 
ranked values. The proxy Overfirm can take a value from 0 to 1. 
 
2.3.5. Control variables 
To control for the effects that internal corporate governance is likely to have on both 
earnings management and CEO vulnerability, we construct a composite measure that takes 
 28 
 
into account three corporate governance characteristics: Board independence, number of 
board meetings, and CEO duality. More independent boards are positively associated to 
performance of bidding firms in successful tender offers (Byrd and Hickman, 1992) and to 
the frequency of boards’ decisions to remove CEOs (Weisbach, 1988). We proxy for board 
independence by using a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the ratio between the 
number of executives that are not members of the board, divided by the total number of 
executives, is greater than 0.50, and 0 otherwise. Board meetings are likely to be more 
frequent if directors perform in accordance to shareholders’ interests. The related dummy 
variable takes the value of 1 if the number of board meetings is greater than the mean, 
computed by sector, and zero otherwise. Finally, CEO non-duality tends to reduce CEOs’ 
opportunistic behaviour (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The correspondent dummy variable 
takes the value of 1 if CEOs are not chairpersons at the same time, and 0 otherwise. The 
composite corporate governance index (Corp_gov) is the sum of the three dummy variables 
described above. Thus, the proxy can take a value between 0 and 3. 
We use several control variables that are likely to have an effect both on earnings 
manipulation proxies and on CEO vulnerability. Current ROA is related to both current 
earnings management (Kothari et al., 2005) and CEO succession (Shen and Cannella, 
2002), and it is computed as the ratio of income before extraordinary items to beginning 
total assets. To take into account firms’ financial structure (DeFond and Jimbalvo, 1994; 
Minton and Schrand, 1999), we use leverage, computed as the ratio of total liabilities to 
total assets. Growth opportunities are likely to provide incentives to manipulate earnings 
(Graham et al., 2005; Skinner and Sloan, 2002) and to increase the importance of 
individual performance evaluation (Bushman et al., 1996). We measure growth 
opportunities through the ratio of book value of assets to the market value of equity (book-
to-market ratio). Firm size, measured through the natural logarithm of total assets, is 
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expected to have an influence both on firms’ political costs (Watts and Zimmermann, 
1990) and on structures and strategies of the firms (Miller, 1991). The standard deviation 
of operating income before extraordinary items is computed over three-year rolling 
windows measures firm risk and it is likely to have an impact on CEOs’ decision to 
manipulate earnings, and on CEO vulnerability. Finally, to control for changes in levels of 
R&D required to stay competitive and that are likely to affect firm strategy, we include 
R&D intensity (Garcia Osma, 2008) computed as the ratio between R&D expenses and 
sales. 
 
2.3.6. Research design 
To test whether managers engage in earnings management in t to mask overinvestment 
in t-1, we apply the following model: 
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Manipulation represents discretionary accruals and sales manipulation, alternatively. 
Overinvestment indicates the three proxies for overinvestment (Overinvestment_full, 
Overinvestment_partial, and Overfirm), alternatively. Equation (5) describes a panel data 
fixed effects model at a firm-level, where the unobservable heterogeneity (u’i) is 
considered (Bascle, 2008). In this way, we take into account unobservable characteristics, 
such as firm culture and management ethics, that are likely to influence both earnings 
management, and CEOs’ decision to overinvest. 
To test whether overinvestment is likely to make CEOs less vulnerable in the future, 
we apply a logit regression that relates the probability of being less vulnerable at time t 
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with overinvestment at time t-1. Although hypothesis H2 refers to a decrease in CEO 
vulnerability in the future as an effect of overinvestment, the narrow time-window of our 
data constrains us to test the effect of investment inefficiencies from one year to the 
following one. 
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Also in this case, Overinvestment indicates the three specifications of overinvestment 
(Overinvestment_full, Overinvestment_partial, and Overfirm), alternatively. When we 
apply Equation (6), we expect a positive coefficient for the three proxies of 
Overinvestment. This would suggest that less vulnerable CEOs are more likely to have 
engaged in overinvestment in the previous period. 
 
2.4. Results 
2.4.1. Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics. The variables DA1, DA2 and SM have means 
close to 0 by constructions. The medians of both Investment_full and Investment_partial 
are smaller than the corresponding means, meaning that most of the firms have a level of 
investments lower than the mean. Both mean and median of Investment_partial are lower 
than the mean and the median of Investment_full, as acquisitions are not included in 
Investment_partial. Overfirm has both mean and median greater than 0.5, which implies 
that most of the firms are likely to engage in overinvestment. Corp_gov is skewed right, 
meaning that most of the firms hold at least two corporate governance characteristics 
among those that are taken into account for the computation of the index. In fact, 4,810 
firm-year observations, corresponding to the 59.16% of the sample, has a value of 
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Corp_gov greater than, or equal to, 2. Finally, most of the observations report a value of 
DTenure equal to 1. Only 2,588 observations (31.83% of the sample) have a value of this 
dummy variable equal to 0, that is, with a CEO tenure lower than 3. 
Table 2 reports the pairwise Spearman correlations. Although the correlations between 
DA1 and both Investment_full and Investment_partial are positive and significant, the 
correlations between Overinvestment_partial and both DA1 and DA2 are negative and 
significant. The correlations between SM and both Overinvestment_full and 
Overinvestment_partial are positive and significant, which is consistent with the 
hypothesis about the association between overinvestment and sales manipulation. Overfirm 
has a negative correlation with both discretionary accruals and sales manipulation proxies. 
Finally, CEO vulnerability, measured through the variable DTenure, has positive 
correlations with all the earnings management proxies. 
 
2.4.2. The effects of overinvestment on earnings management 
Table 3 reports results about the associations between overinvestment in the previous 
period and both discretionary accruals and sales manipulation by using Overinvestment_full 
as a proxy of overinvestment. The associations between Overinvestment_full and both 
discretionary accruals and sales manipulation are positive and significant. Untabulated 
results confirm the positive association between Overinvestment_full and the performance-
adjusted discretionary accruals proxy (DA2) also when ROA is added in the model as a 
control variable. These results are consistent with the prediction of a positive association 
between overinvestment and subsequent earnings management. The relation between 
corporate governance characteristics (Corp_gov) and discretionary accruals is negative and 
significant, as in previous literature (Klein, 2002; Xie et al., 2003; Ahmed and Duellman, 
2007; Garcia Lara et al., 2009). However, the association between Corp_Gov and sales 
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manipulation (SM) is no longer significant. This result suggests that strong corporate 
governance is able to decrease accounting manipulation, represented by discretionary 
accruals, but it is not able to reduce sales manipulation, which is more difficult to be 
detected. The association between ROA and discretionary accruals is positive and 
significant, consistent with previous literature (Dechow et al., 1995; Kasznik, 1999; 
McNichols, 2000), whilst the association between ROA and sales manipulation is negative 
and significant (Cohen and Zarowin, 2010). Results from Table 3 support our first 
hypothesis stating a positive association between overinvestment and earnings management 
in the following period. Furthermore, to cover investment inefficiencies, CEOs are likely to 
manipulate not only accounting numbers, with the consequent effect of decreasing 
subsequent earnings due to their reversal effect, but also real activities such as sales, with 
an impact on cash flows and, therefore, on future firm value (Graham et al., 2005; 
Roychowdhury, 2006). 
Table 4 reports results from Equation (5) by using Overinvestment_partial, which 
excludes acquisitions from the definition of investments, as a proxy of overinvestment. By 
using this alternative proxy of overinvestment, we obtain results confirming the positive 
associations between overinvestment in the previous period, and current earnings 
management. The variable Overinvestment_partial is positively associated with both DA 
and SM, implying that more overinvestment is likely to lead to more discretionary accruals 
and sales manipulation in subsequent periods. Furthermore, the coefficient of the 
associations between Overinvestment_partial and both DA1 and DA2 are roughly as twice 
as those obtained by using Overinvestment_full as a proxy of overinvestment. Results are 
confirmed if we add ROA as a control variable when we use DA2 as a proxy of 
discretionary accruals (untabulated result). Table 4 suggests that, at least for discretionary 
accruals, the definition of investments through items that are difficult to observe, such as 
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capital expenditures and R&D expenses, leads CEOs to manipulate accounting numbers 
more intensively than the case in which acquisitions are included. Through discretionary 
accruals, CEOs are expected to better hide the inefficiency of their investments that are 
more difficult to be monitored. 
Finally, Table 5 shows results on the associations between overinvestment and 
earnings management by using Overfirm as a proxy of overinvestment, which is based on 
cash balance and leverage. To avoid multicollinearity problems, we do not use leverage as 
a control variable when we use the variable Overfirm in the model. The association 
between Overfirm and DA1 is positive and significant. When we use ROA for the 
computation of the discretionary accruals proxy (DA2), the association is still positive and 
significant. Using the performance-adjusted discretionary accruals model allows us to 
isolate the effects that investment inefficiencies have on earnings management decisions 
from firm performance as a determinant of discretionary accruals. Thus, firms having ex-
ante conditions to overinvest, such as high cash balance and low leverage, are also likely to 
engage in discretionary accruals in the subsequent period. Finally, the association between 
Overfirm and sales manipulation is not significant, arguably because in firms with high 
cash availability (included in the construction of Overfirm), the manipulation of sales may 
have a reduced negative impact on firms’ cash flows (measured through the proxy SM), 
compared to the impact on firms with little cash balance. 
 
2.4.3. The effects of overinvestment on CEO vulnerability 
Table 6 shows empirical results for hypothesis H2, which states that vulnerable CEOs 
are likely to overinvest to decrease their vulnerability in the future. Table 6, Panel A, 
presents results from Equation (7) in which the variable Overinvestment_full is used as a 
proxy of overinvestment. The log of the odds increases when Overinvestment_full increases 
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and when Corp_gov decreases. The signs are confirmed by using the variables for 
overinvestment and corporate governance both separately and jointly. The positive and 
significant sign of Overinvestment_full suggests that the probability that in the future CEOs 
become less vulnerable in terms of tenure is higher when they overinvest and when 
corporate governance is weaker. Also, the negative sign of Corp_Gov is consistent with 
previous literature stating that CEOs dismissal are more likely to occur as the intensity of 
board monitoring increases (Hermalin, 2005). Untabulated results remains constant when 
the variable Overinvestment_partial is used, instead of Overinvestment_full. Results in 
Panel B, Table 6, are consistent with these statements when the variable Overfirm is used. 
However, because high values of Overfirm imply high cash availability and low leverage, 
the interpretation of Table 6, Panel B, may be spurious, as CEOs’ vulnerability may 
decrease in the future simply because they are running firms well. 
 
2.4.4. Robustness checks 
We conduct several robustness checks to validate our results.  
Regarding the association between overinvestment and earnings management, we first 
compute an alternative proxy of overinvestment following Biddle et al. (2009). In Equation 
(4), we define Investments as the sum of capital expenditures, R&D expenditures, and 
acquisitions, minus sales of PPE, scaled by beginning total assets, and express it as a 
function of sales growth. Second, we use an alternative configuration of both 
Overinvestment_full and Overinvestment_partial. We define them as dummy variables that 
take the value of 1 if the correspondent value of the residuals falls in the fourth quartile, 
and 0 otherwise. Third, we include in Equation (5) year dummies to control for aggregate 
fluctuations. Finally, we proxy discretionary accruals using the forward-looking 
discretionary accruals model (Dechow et al., 2003), and sales manipulation using CFOs as 
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in Compustat annual industrial and research files (annual Compustat data item #6) in 
Equation (3). Results hold after these checks. 
With respect to vulnerable CEOs’ usage of overinvestment to decrease their 
vulnerability in the future, results remain stable after including year dummies, and after 
substituting the Inv_groups specifications for a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if 
Inv_efficiency is in the last quartile, and 0 otherwise. 
 
2.5. Conclusions 
Financial reporting is expected to reduce CEOs’ opportunistic behaviour (Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1983; Watts, 2003) as it allows stakeholders to monitor managerial choices. 
For example, enhanced financial reporting quality is likely to decrease CEOs’ 
overinvestment (Biddle and Hillary, 2006; Verdi, 2006; Biddle et al., 2009; Francis and 
Martin, 2010). We contribute to this stream of literature in two ways: First, we hypothesize 
that managers introduce bias to financial reporting information to hide to stakeholders 
CEOs’ investment inefficiencies. We take into account two kinds of financial reporting 
distortions: Discretionary accruals and sales manipulation. We expect and find a positive 
association between overinvestment and both discretionary accruals and sales manipulation 
in the subsequent period. Results also suggest that managers are likely to engage more in 
discretionary accruals if overinvestment is related to expenditures that are more difficult to 
monitor (such as capital expenditure and R&D expenses), so that earnings management is 
more effective in hiding investment inefficiencies. Also, results show that firms that are 
more likely to overinvest, such as those reporting high cash balance and low leverage, still 
engage in discretionary accruals. Second, we argue that CEOs overinvest to achieve their 
personal objectives, such as a decrease in their vulnerability in the future. Results suggest 
that less vulnerable CEOs are more likely to have overinvested in the previous period, 
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consistent with the idea that CEOs overinvest to make their replacement more costly 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1989), and that overinvestment decreases the probability to be 
removed through takeovers by making the firm less attractive. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
Variables 25th percentile Mean Median 75th percentile Standard deviation 
DA1 -0.0406 -0.0047 -0.0018 0.0353 0.1507 
DA2 -0.0351 -0.0057 -0.0017 0.0273 0.0608 
SM -0.1096 0.0002 -0.0053 0.0902 0.2225 
Investment_full 1.4877 10.8548 6.6019 14.6045 17.3409 
Investment_partial 0.2047 6.5590 3.4793 9.6000 14.4287 
Overinvestment_full -1 0.0002 0 1 0.7028 
Overinvestment_partial -1 -0.0033 0 0 0.7069 
Overfirm 0.35 0.5506 0.55 0.75 0.2473 
Corp_Gov 1 1.6214 2 2 0.8044 
DTenure 0 0.6817 1 1 0.4658 
TACC -0.0980 -0.0633 -0.0549 -0.0179 0.1573 
Leverage 0.3158 0.4847 0.4804 0.6197 0.3042 
ROA 0.0176 0.0479 0.0619 0.1094 0.2068 
 
The number of firm-year observations is equal to 6,424. DA1 is discretionary accruals, computed through the 
modified Jones model, as in Dechow et al. (1995); DA2 is discretionary accruals, computed through the 
modified Jones model augmented by ROA, as in Kothari et al. (2005); SM is sales manipulation computed as 
the inverted sign of sales manipulation proxy (Roychowdhury, 2006), in which the CFOs scaled by beginning 
total assets used to run the model are equal to the sum between the original CFOs scaled by beginning total 
assets, and the difference between the median by year and by sector of discretionary expenses scaled by 
beginning total assets and discretionary expenses scaled by beginning total assets of each firm-year 
observation; Investment_full is the sum of capital expenditures, R&D expenditures, and acquisitions, minus 
sales of PPE and depreciation and amortization, multiplied by 100, and divided by beginning total assets; 
Investment_partial is the sum of capital expenditures and R&D expenditures,  minus sales of PPE and 
depreciation and amortization, multiplied by 100, divided by beginning total assets; Overinvestment_full 
takes the value of (-1) if the correspondent residuals of investments, measured by the proxy Investment_full, 
fall in the first quartile, 0 if the correspondent residuals of investments, measured by the proxy 
Investment_full, fall either in the second or in the third quartile, and 1 if the correspondent residuals of 
investments, measured by the proxy Investment_full, fall in the fourth quartile; Overinvestment_partial takes 
the value of (-1) if the correspondent residuals of investments, measured by the proxy Investment_partial, fall 
in the first quartile, 0 if the correspondent residuals of investments, measured by the proxy 
Investment_partial, fall either in the second or in the third quartile, and 1 if the correspondent residuals of 
investments, measured by the proxy Investment_partial, fall in the fourth quartile; Overfirm is a composite 
measure computed as the average of re-scaled deciles of cash balance and the reciprocal of leverage; 
Corp_gov is a composite measure that is the sum of three dummy variables for internal corporate governance 
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characteristics (board independence, number of board meetings, CEO non-duality); DTenure is a dummy 
variable that takes the value of 1 if CEO tenure is greater than 3, and 0 otherwise; TACC is total accruals, 
scaled by beginning total assets; Leverage is the ratio between total liabilities and total assets; ROA is the 
ratio between income before extraordinary assets and beginning total assets. 
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Table 2 – Correlation matrix 
 
 DA1 DA2 SM Investment_full 
Investment_
partial Overinvestment_full 
Overinves
tment_par
tial 
Overfirm Corp_Gov DTenure TACC Leverage ROA 
DA1 1             
DA2 0.8394 1            
SM 0.0236 0.0799 1           
Investment_ful
l 0.0438 -0.0006 0.1024 1  
 
  
 
 
 
  
Investment_pa
rtial 0.0437 -0.0131 0.1502 0.7663 1 
 
    
 
  
Overinvestme
nt_full -0.0148 -0.0090 0.1701 0.5953 0.3551 
1 
    
 
  
Overinvestme
nt_partial -0.0281 -0.0280 0.2622 0.3978 0.5419 0.5803 1    
 
  
Overfirm -0.0319 -0.0996 0.0010 0.2259 0.3715 0.0090 0.1504 1      
Corp_Gov -0.0843 -0.0731 0.0567 0.0413 0.0234 0.0349 0.0337 0.0648 1     
DTenure 0.0250 0.0167 -0.0186 0.0728 0.0726 0.0185 0.0242 0.0396 -0.2198 1    
TACC 0.6839 0.6513 0.0963 -0.0277 -0.0441 -0.0631 -0.0677 -0.0496 -0.0962 0.0239 1   
Leverage -0.0495 0.0202 0.0542 -0.2210 -0.3247 -0.0278 -0.1308 -0.8664 0.0020 -0.0616 -0.0103 1  
ROA 0.1780 0.0531 -0.1465 0.2708 0.2559 0.0322 0.0170 0.2453 -0.1094 0.0573 0.2076 -0.2936 1 
 
Pairwise Spearman correlations. Correlations in bold are significant at the 10% level. 
 
The number of firm-year observations is equal to 6,424. DA1 is discretionary accruals, computed through the modified Jones model, as in Dechow et al. (1995); DA2 is 
discretionary accruals, computed through the modified Jones model augmented by ROA, as in Kothari et al. (2005); SM is sales manipulation computed as the inverted sign of 
sales manipulation proxy (Roychowdhury, 2006), in which the CFOs scaled by beginning total assets used to run the model are equal to the sum between the original CFOs 
scaled by beginning total assets, and the difference between the median by year and by sector of discretionary expenses scaled by beginning total assets and discretionary 
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expenses scaled by beginning total assets of each firm-year observation; Investment_full is the sum of capital expenditures, R&D expenditures, and acquisitions, minus sales of 
PPE and depreciation and amortization, multiplied by 100, and divided by beginning total assets; Investment_partial is the sum of capital expenditures and R&D expenditures,  
minus sales of PPE and depreciation and amortization, multiplied by 100, divided by beginning total assets; Overinvestment_full takes the value of (-1) if the correspondent 
residuals of investments, measured by the proxy Investment_full, fall in the first quartile, 0 if the correspondent residuals of investments, measured by the proxy 
Investment_full, fall either in the second or in the third quartile, and 1 if the correspondent residuals of investments, measured by the proxy Investment_full, fall in the fourth 
quartile; Overinvestment_partial takes the value of (-1) if the correspondent residuals of investments, measured by the proxy Investment_partial, fall in the first quartile, 0 if 
the correspondent residuals of investments, measured by the proxy Investment_partial, fall either in the second or in the third quartile, and 1 if the correspondent residuals of 
investments, measured by the proxy Investment_partial, fall in the fourth quartile; Overfirm is a composite measure computed as the average of re-scaled deciles of cash 
balance and the reciprocal of leverage; Corp_gov is a composite measure that is the sum of three dummy variables for internal corporate governance characteristics (board 
independence, number of board meetings, CEO non-duality); DTenure is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if CEO tenure is greater than 3, and 0 otherwise; TACC is 
total accruals, scaled by beginning total assets; Leverage is the ratio between total liabilities and total assets; ROA is the ratio between income before extraordinary assets and 
beginning total assets. 
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Table 3 – The association between earnings management tools and investment 
levels, including acquisitions 
 
 Discretionary accruals  Sales manipulation 
VARIABLES DA1
 t DA2 t  SM t 
     
Constant 0.0132 0.0397***  -0.2316*** 
 (0.39) (0.00)  (0.00) 
Overinvestment_full
 t-1 0.0023* 0.0030**  0.0107*** 
 (0.08) (0.02)  (0.00) 
Corp_Gov
 t  -0.0025* -0.0030**  0.0015 
 (0.08) (0.02)  (0.52) 
ROA
 t 0.3243***   -0.2796*** 
 (0.00)   (0.00) 
Leverage
 t 0.0015 -0.0227***  0.0383*** 
 (0.86) (0.00)  (0.01) 
Book to market
 t 0.0145*** -0.0065**  -0.0004 
 (0.00) (0.04)  (0.95) 
Total assets (ln)
 t -0.0052** -0.0025  0.0237*** 
 (0.01) (0.20)  (0.00) 
IB (stand. dev.)
 t -0.0709*** -0.0883***  -0.0810** 
 (0.00) (0.00)  (0.02) 
R&D intensity
 t -0.0464 -0.1781***  1.7295*** 
 (0.37) (0.00)  (0.00) 
 
    
Observations 6424 6424  6424 
R2 0.135 0.013  0.146 
p-values in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 3 reports the results from the following panel data fixed effect model, which controls for both 
unobservable and observable heterogeneity: 
itititjjittiit uControlsgovCorpfullmentOverinvestonManipulati ''__ ,21,1 εβββα ++Σ+++= −  
DA1 is discretionary accruals, computed through the modified Jones model, as in Dechow et al. (1995); 
DA2 is discretionary accruals, computed through the modified Jones model augmented by ROA, as in 
Kothari et al. (2005); SM is sales manipulation computed as the inverted sign of sales manipulation proxy 
(Roychowdhury, 2006), in which the CFOs scaled by beginning total assets used to run the model are 
equal to the sum between the original CFOs scaled by beginning total assets, and the difference between 
the median by year and by sector of discretionary expenses scaled by beginning total assets and 
discretionary expenses scaled by beginning total assets of each firm-year observation; Overinvestment_full 
takes the value of (-1) if the correspondent residuals of investments, measured by the proxy 
Investment_full, fall in the first quartile, 0 if the correspondent residuals of investments, measured by the 
proxy Investment_full, fall either in the second or in the third quartile, and 1 if the correspondent residuals 
of investments, measured by the proxy Investment_full, fall in the fourth quartile; Corp_gov is a 
composite measure that is the sum of three dummy variables for internal corporate governance 
characteristics (board independence, number of board meetings, CEO non-duality); ROA is the ratio 
between income before extraordinary assets and beginning total assets; Leverage is the ratio between total 
liabilities and total assets; Book to market is the ratio of book value of assets to the market value of equity; 
Total assets (ln) is the natural logarithm of firms’ total assets; IB (stand dev) is the standard deviation of 
income before extraordinary items computed by using rolling firm-specific three-year windows; R&D 
intensity is the ratio between R&D expenses and sales. 
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Table 4 – The association between earnings management tools and investment 
levels, excluding acquisitions 
 
 Discretionary accruals  Sales manipulation 
VARIABLES DA1
 t DA2 t  SM t 
     
Constant 0.0145 0.0400***  -0.2342*** 
 (0.34) (0.00)  (0.00) 
Overinvestment_partial
 t-1 0.0065*** 0.0056***  0.0079*** 
 (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) 
Corp_Gov
 t  -0.0025* -0.0031**  0.0012 
 (0.08) (0.02)  (0.62) 
ROA
 t 0.3233***   -0.2825*** 
 (0.00)   (0.00) 
Leverage
 t 0.0019 -0.0221***  0.0403*** 
 (0.83) (0.00)  (0.01) 
Book to market
 t 0.0146*** -0.0064**  -0.0008 
 (0.00) (0.05)  (0.89) 
Total assets (ln)
 t -0.0054*** -0.0025  0.0241*** 
 (0.01) (0.19)  (0.00) 
IB (stand. dev.)
 t -0.0714*** -0.0886***  -0.0825** 
 (0.00) (0.00)  (0.02) 
R&D intensity
 t -0.0554 -0.1829***  1.7349*** 
 (0.28) (0.00)  (0.00) 
 
    
Observations 6424 6424  6424 
R2 0.137 0.015  0.143 
p-values in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 4 reports the results from the following panel data fixed effect model, which controls for both 
unobservable and observable heterogeneity: 
 
itititjjittiit uControlsgovCorppartialmentOverinvestonManipulati ''__ ,21,1 εβββα ++Σ+++= −  
DA1 is discretionary accruals, computed through the modified Jones model, as in Dechow et al. (1995); 
DA2 is discretionary accruals, computed through the modified Jones model augmented by ROA, as in 
Kothari et al. (2005); SM is sales manipulation computed as the inverted sign of sales manipulation proxy 
(Roychowdhury, 2006), in which the CFOs scaled by beginning total assets used to run the model are 
equal to the sum between the original CFOs scaled by beginning total assets, and the difference between 
the median by year and by sector of discretionary expenses scaled by beginning total assets and 
discretionary expenses scaled by beginning total assets of each firm-year observation; 
Overinvestment_partial takes the value of (-1) if the correspondent residuals of investments, measured by 
the proxy Investment_partial, fall in the first quartile, 0 if the correspondent residuals of investments, 
measured by the proxy Investment_partial, fall either in the second or in the third quartile, and 1 if the 
correspondent residuals of investments, measured by the proxy Investment_partial, fall in the fourth 
quartile; Corp_gov is a composite measure that is the sum of three dummy variables for internal corporate 
governance characteristics (board independence, number of board meetings, CEO non-duality); ROA is 
the ratio between income before extraordinary assets and beginning total assets; Leverage is the ratio 
between total liabilities and total assets; Book to market is the ratio of book value of assets to the market 
value of equity; Total assets (ln) is the natural logarithm of firms’ total assets; IB (stand dev) is the 
standard deviation of income before extraordinary items computed by using rolling firm-specific three-
year windows; R&D intensity is the ratio between R&D expenses and sales. 
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Table 5 – The association between earnings management tools and the likelihood 
of overinvesting 
 
 Discretionary accruals  Sales manipulation 
VARIABLES DA1
 t DA2 t  SM t 
     
Constant 0.0020 0.0109  -0.2273*** 
 (0.90) (0.44)  (0.00) 
Overfirm
 t-1 0.0165** 0.0312***  0.0069 
 (0.03) (0.00)  (0.58) 
Corp_Gov
 t  -0.0026* -0.0034***  0.0013 
 (0.07) (0.01)  (0.57) 
ROA
 t 0.3216***   -0.2951*** 
 (0.00)   (0.00) 
Book to market
 t 0.0143*** -0.0053  -0.0037 
 (0.00) (0.10)  (0.54) 
Total assets (ln)
 t -0.0049** -0.0025  0.0254*** 
 (0.02) (0.19)  (0.00) 
IB (stand. dev.)
 t -0.0668*** -0.0870***  -0.0716** 
 (0.00) (0.00)  (0.05) 
R&D intensity
 t -0.0400 -0.1767***  1.7592*** 
 (0.44) (0.00)  (0.00) 
 
    
Observations 6424 6424  6424 
R2 0.135 0.014  0.141 
p-values in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 5 reports the results from the following panel data fixed effect model, which controls for both 
unobservable and observable heterogeneity: 
 
itititjjittiit uControlsgovCorpOverfirmonManipulati ''_ ,21,1 εβββα ++Σ+++= −  
DA1 is discretionary accruals, computed through the modified Jones model, as in Dechow et al. (1995); 
DA2 is discretionary accruals, computed through the modified Jones model augmented by ROA, as in 
Kothari et al. (2005); SM is sales manipulation computed as the inverted sign of sales manipulation proxy 
(Roychowdhury, 2006), in which the CFOs scaled by beginning total assets used to run the model are 
equal to the sum between the original CFOs scaled by beginning total assets, and the difference between 
the median by year and by sector of discretionary expenses scaled by beginning total assets and 
discretionary expenses scaled by beginning total assets of each firm-year observation; Overfirm is a 
composite measure computed as the average of re-scaled deciles of cash balance and the reciprocal of 
leverage; Corp_gov is a composite measure that is the sum of three dummy variables for internal 
corporate governance characteristics (board independence, number of board meetings, CEO non-duality); 
ROA is the ratio between income before extraordinary assets and beginning total assets; Book to market is 
the ratio of book value of assets to the market value of equity; Total assets (ln) is the natural logarithm of 
firms’ total assets; IB (stand dev) is the standard deviation of income before extraordinary items computed 
by using rolling firm-specific three-year windows; R&D intensity is the ratio between R&D expenses and 
sales. 
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Table 6, Panel A – The relation between CEO vulnerability and investment 
levels, including acquisitions 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES DTenure
 t DTenure t DTenure t 
    
Constant 1.4237*** 2.4311*** 2.4729*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Overinvestment_full
 t-1 0.1510***  0.1673*** 
 (0.00)  (0.00) 
Corp_Gov
 t  -0.6404*** -0.6437*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) 
Leverage
 t 0.5420 0.1480 0.1319 
 (0.11) (0.67) (0.70) 
ROA
 t -0.6199*** -0.6158*** -0.6295*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Book to market
 t -0.1424 -0.1071 -0.1257 
 (0.10) (0.23) (0.16) 
Total assets (ln)
 t -0.0322 -0.0311 -0.0319 
 (0.17) (0.19) (0.18) 
IB (stand. dev.)
 t -1.2850** -0.5560 -0.4581 
 (0.02) (0.32) (0.41) 
R&D intensity
 t -0.6702 0.5899 0.0664 
 (0.26) (0.32) (0.91) 
    
Observations 6424 6424 6424 
Pseudo R2 0.0076 0.0457 0.0478 
 
Robust z-values in parentheses 
*** z<0.01, ** z<0.05, * z<0.1 
Table 6 reports the results from the following logit model: 
 
ititjjittiit ControlsgovCorpfullmentOverinvestDTenure εβββα +Σ+++= − ,21,1 _º_  
DTenure is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if CEO tenure is greater than 3, and 0 otherwise; 
Overinvestment_full takes the value of (-1) if the correspondent residuals of investments, measured by the 
proxy Investment_full, fall in the first quartile, 0 if the correspondent residuals of investments, measured 
by the proxy Investment_full, fall either in the second or in the third quartile, and 1 if the correspondent 
residuals of investments, measured by the proxy Investment_full, fall in the fourth quartile; Corp_gov is a 
composite measure that is the sum of three dummy variables for internal corporate governance 
characteristics (board independence, number of board meetings, CEO non-duality); ROA is the ratio 
between income before extraordinary assets and beginning total assets; Leverage is the ratio between total 
liabilities and total assets; Book to market is the ratio of book value of assets to the market value of equity; 
Total assets (ln) is the natural logarithm of firms’ total assets; IB (stand dev) is the standard deviation of 
income before extraordinary items computed by using rolling firm-specific three-year windows; R&D 
intensity is the ratio between R&D expenses and sales. 
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Table 6, Panel B – The relation between CEO vulnerability and the likelihood 
of overinvestment 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES DTenure
 t DTenure t DTenure t 
    
Constant 0.9308*** 2.2680*** 1.8700*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Overfirm
 t-1 0.3552***  0.4802*** 
 (0.01)  (0.00) 
Corp_Gov
 t  -0.6399*** -0.6462*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) 
ROA
 t 0.7870** 0.5896* 0.3079 
 (0.02) (0.07) (0.36) 
Book to market
 t -0.0690 -0.0471 -0.0487 
 (0.42) (0.60) (0.58) 
Total assets (ln)
 t -0.0423* -0.0628*** -0.0349 
 (0.07) (0.00) (0.14) 
CFO (stand. dev.)
 t -1.5071*** -0.5285 -0.7425 
 (0.01) (0.34) (0.18) 
R&D intensity
 t -0.1524 1.2835** 0.4248 
 (0.80) (0.03) (0.50) 
    
Observations 6424 6424 6424 
Pseudo R2 0.0046 0.0437 0.0452 
 
Robust z-values in parentheses 
*** z<0.01, ** z<0.05, * z<0.1 
Table 6 reports the results from the following logit model: 
 
ititjjittiit ControlsgovCorpOverfirmDTenure εβββα +Σ+++= − ,21,1 _  
DTenure is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if CEO tenure is greater than 3, and 0 otherwise; 
Overfirm is a composite measure computed as the average of re-scaled deciles of cash balance and the 
reciprocal of leverage; Corp_gov is a composite measure that is the sum of three dummy variables for 
internal corporate governance characteristics (board independence, number of board meetings, CEO non-
duality); ROA is the ratio between income before extraordinary assets and beginning total assets; Book to 
market is the ratio of book value of assets to the market value of equity; Total assets (ln) is the natural 
logarithm of firms’ total assets; IB (stand dev) is the standard deviation of income before extraordinary 
items computed by using rolling firm-specific three-year windows; R&D intensity is the ratio between 
R&D expenses and sales. 
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Chapter 3 - Entrenched Managers’ Usage of Earnings Management Tools 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Although managerial entrenchment has been typically considered as a signal 
of weak governance, we show that entrenched managers engage less in 
earnings management through discretionary accruals and through real 
activities manipulation. Both of these earnings management tools are 
detrimental to firm value. In fact, discretionary accruals decrease subsequent 
earnings due to its reversal property, and real activities manipulation 
decreases future firm performance due to its direct impact on cash flow. 
Furthermore, we show that entrenched managers engage more aggressively 
in smoothing the earnings stream, which may be considered as less 
detrimental to firm value. Because entrenched managers are less likely to 
engage in earnings management tools that reduce future firm performance, 
we also expect and find a positive association between CEO entrenchment 
and subsequent firm operating performance. 
 
 
3.1. Introduction 
Managerial entrenchment represents one of the costliest manifestations of the 
agency problem between shareholders and managers (Jensen and Ruback, 1983). 
Managers, who place a great value on control but own only a small equity stake, work to 
ensure their own job security and staying on in that position even if no longer competent 
or qualified to run the firm (Shleifer and Vishny, 1989). Managerial entrenchment can 
be thus defined as “the extent to which managers fail to experience discipline from the 
full range of corporate governance and control mechanisms” (Berger et al., 1997: 1411). 
There are different classes of managerial entrenchment practices to neutralize the 
discipline of corporate governance and control mechanisms. Antitakeover devices, 
poison pills, or golden parachutes are some examples of such practices (Gompers et al., 
2003). Other authors (e.g., De Miguel et al., 2004) have emphasized intermediate levels 
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of managerial ownership as a takeover deterrence mechanism that promotes managerial 
entrenchment. The use of these different mechanisms generates a decrease in managerial 
turnover, which explains why CEO tenure has also been used by different authors as a 
proxy for managerial entrenchment (Fredrickson et al., 1988; Shen, 2003). 
CEOs’ entrenchment reduces the probability of a firm to be taken over and, thus, to 
receive valuable offers that benefit shareholders’ wealth (Ambrose and Megginson, 
1992; Pound, 1987). Furthermore, CEOs’ strategies to entrench themselves, such as 
anti-takeover devices (Williamson, 1975; Jensen, 1988; Ambrose and Megginson, 
1992), or manager-specific investments (Shleifer and Vishny, 1989), lead to the 
expropriation of shareholders’ wealth and to an inefficient allocation of firms’ 
resources. 
A competing theoretical perspective states that CEOs’ entrenchment can help align 
managers’ interests with those of shareholders. Stein (1989), for example, argues that 
CEOs that are not entrenched and that, therefore, are under market pressure, tend to 
behave “myopically” by providing signals of the firm efficiency to the stakeholders 
through short-term performance increases. As capital markets rarely have access to 
private information, market-pressured managers are more likely to choose strategies that 
are able to increase short-term earnings, at the expense of riskier long-term investments 
that are expected to provide higher benefits in the long run. 
We contribute to this stream of literature by arguing that entrenched CEOs are less 
likely to engage in earnings management tools, such as discretionary accruals and real 
activities manipulation, to achieve short-term objectives. Contrarily, market-pressured 
CEOs may engage in both discretionary accruals and real activities manipulation in an 
effort to mislead markets about firms’ short-term value. The manipulation of 
discretionary accruals leads to an increase of the current share value and to an 
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accounting reversal effect in subsequent periods, while the manipulation of real 
activities leads to an increase of the current firm value, first, and to a decrease of future 
firm’s value, later. Both of the effects make firms less attractive as a target of takeovers 
and incumbent managers are less likely to be removed. Although we expect a negative 
association between CEOs’ entrenchment and both discretionary accruals and real 
activities manipulation, we also expect a positive association between CEOs’ 
entrenchment and income smoothing, which is more likely to satisfy long-term 
objectives. Entrenched managers are less pressured by the capital markets and can better 
focus on long-term objectives. According to a survey conducted by Graham et al. 
(2005), managers perceive income smoothing as useful to achieve long-term results 
such as reductions of the cost of capital and debt financing. 
The use of earnings management tools as an entrenchment strategy has important 
implications on firm value. CEOs’ entrenchment is expected to be negatively associated 
to both discretionary accruals and real activities manipulation, which are detrimental to 
firm value. Discretionary accruals have the effect of decreasing subsequent earnings due 
to their reversal effect. Real activities manipulation directly affects cash flow and, thus, 
the future value of firms (Roychowdhury, 2006). However, entrenched CEOs are 
expected to smooth the earnings stream, which can be less detrimental to firm future 
performance. Although part of the literature states that income smoothing is not 
beneficial for shareholders, as it decreases earnings informativeness (Bhattacharya et al., 
2003), better masks CEOs’ private interests (Leuz et al., 2003), and has no association 
with firm value (Rountree et al., 2008; McInnis, 2010), some authors argue that income 
smoothing increases earnings informativeness if managers use this manipulation tool to 
communicate their assessment of future earnings (Tucker and Zarowin, 2006), and that 
income smoothing is valuable to stockholders, as it decreases firms’ cost of borrowing 
 53 
 
(Trueman and Titman, 1988). We then expect a positive association between CEOs’ 
entrenchment and subsequent firm operating performance as a consequence of the 
effects that entrenched CEOs’ usage of earnings management tools have on future 
operating performance in the following periods. 
We test these contentions using a US sample for the period 1992-2006. We take 
accounting data from Compustat, corporate governance characteristics from 
Execucomp, and stock returns from CRSP. The final sample consists of 11,802 firm-
year observations and of 1,714 different firms. We create our own measure of 
entrenchment through a composite index that takes into account the antitakeover 
provision index proposed by Bebchuck et al. (2009), CEO tenure, and managerial 
ownership. Results support the expectations: CEOs’ entrenchment is positively 
associated with income smoothing, and negatively associated with both discretionary 
accruals and real activities manipulation. We also study the association between future 
operating performance (measured through ROA in subsequent periods), and the use of 
the different earnings management tools. Our results show that income smoothing is less 
detrimental to firm operating performance in the following years than discretionary 
accruals and, especially, real activities manipulation. Real activities manipulation is the 
earnings management tool that decreases future firm operating performance the most. 
Consistent with entrenched managers using more income smoothing, less discretionary 
accruals, and less real activities manipulation to manage earnings, our performance tests 
show that entrenchment is positively related to future operating performance over the 
two coming years. These results are robust to alternative measures of earnings 
management tools and to the use of several estimation methods. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 defines the earnings 
management tools and highlights the opportunities that these tools offer to CEOs to 
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entrench themselves, and their consequences on future firm performance. Section 3 
develops the hypotheses. Section 4 describes data, variable definitions and empirical 
methods. Section 5 reports the results. Section 6 concludes. 
 
3.2. Earnings management tools 
In our analysis of the effect of managerial entrenchment practices on CEO’s 
preferences for the use of different earnings management tools, we focused on three 
types of earnings management tools: income smoothing, discretionary accruals, and real 
activities manipulation. CEOs use different earnings management tool according to its 
effect on firm value both on the short- and on the long-run. 
 
3.2.1. Income smoothing 
Income smoothing is defined as the “process of manipulating the time profile of 
earnings or earnings reports to make the reported income stream less variable” 
(Fudenberg and Tirole, 1995: 75). CEOs make income streams less variable by shifting 
earnings from good years to less successful years. 
Previous literature has discussed the effects of income smoothing on firm future 
performance. Some authors observe that income smoothing does not have favorable 
consequences for shareholders. If income streams are artificially smooth, they decrease 
the informativeness of reported earnings and, thus, increase earnings “opacity” 
(Bhattacharya et al., 2003). In this way, managers can better mask their private control 
benefits (Leuz et al., 2003). Besides the negative effect on the informativeness of 
earnings, recent literature argues that income smoothing does not lower the implied cost 
of equity and does not lead to greater average returns. McInnis (2010), for example, 
finds no relationship between earnings smoothness and average stock returns. Rountree 
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et al. (2008) show that, while the volatility of cash flows is actually negatively related to 
firm value, the volatility of earnings, which can be manipulated by managers through 
accruals to obtain smoother income streams, has no association with firm value. Other 
authors, however, argue that income smoothing has positive effects for shareholders. In 
a survey conducted by Graham et al. (2005), more than 96% of chief financial officers 
(CFOs) argue that they engage in income smoothing to lower investors’ perceptions of 
firm risk. CFOs expect smoother income decreases both cost of capital and cost of debt. 
Income smoothing is also likely to reduce idiosyncratic risk (Gill-de-Albornoz and 
Markarian, 2009), and to increase future earnings informativeness (Tucker and Zarowin, 
2006) if CEOs use this tool to provide further information about their future earnings 
expectations.  
 
3.2.2. Discretionary accruals 
Discretionary accruals are based on the manipulation of accrual accounting, which 
can be defined as “the accrual and deferral of past, current and anticipated future cash 
receipts and disbursements” (Richardson et al., 2005: 441). Because the computation of 
accruals is based on assumptions and estimates, CEOs can opportunistically manipulate 
it to mislead users of financial statements (Jones, 1991; Dechow and Dichev, 2002). 
CEOs engage in discretionary accruals to increase firm value on the short run, as 
the effects of discretionary accruals must reverse some time in the future. Previous 
literature observes that CEOs engage in discretionary accruals to achieve specific short-
term objectives, highlighting the reversal effect that this earnings management tool has 
on subsequent firm performance. Teoh et al. (1998), for example, find that managers 
temporarily increase reported incomes through discretionary accruals before an initial 
public offering (IPO) to lead buyers to pay higher prices. However, after the IPO, firms 
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engaging in discretionary accruals before the IPO are likely to experience lower 
cumulative abnormal returns than firms not engaging in discretionary accruals. 
 
3.2.3. Real activities manipulation 
Real activities manipulation is defined as “departures from normal operational 
practices, motivated by managers desire to mislead at least some stakeholders into 
believing certain financial reporting goals have been met in the normal course of 
operations” (Roychowdhury, 2006: 337). For example, CEOs can temporarily increase 
sales by offering price discounts or more lenient credit terms. 
CEOs are likely to engage in real activities manipulation to increase reported 
earnings on the short-run, as real activities manipulation has the effect of decreasing 
long-term firm performance. For example, Cohen and Zarowin (2010) show that, during 
seasoned equity offerings (SEOs), firms are likely to engage in both discretionary 
accruals and real activities manipulation. However, the authors observe that the decline 
in firms’ performance is more severe after real activities manipulation rather than after 
discretionary accruals, as real activities manipulation directly affects cash flows. 
 
3.3. Hypotheses development 
In this section, we develop hypotheses about the effects that CEOs’ entrenchment 
has on income smoothing, discretionary accruals, and real activities manipulation. Later, 
we analyze how CEOs’ entrenchment can affect subsequent operating performance. 
 
3.3.1. CEOs’ entrenchment and performance manipulation 
Although CEOs’ entrenchment is typically conceived as a manifestation of the 
agency problem, an alternative stream of literature observes that managerial 
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entrenchment can increase the alignment between managers’ and shareholders’ interests. 
Under certain circumstances, entrenchment can be optimal to reduce managers’ 
“myopia”. As capital markets rarely have access to private information of the firm, 
market-pressured managers tend to focus on quantifiable results (such as accounting 
numbers). Therefore, CEOs that are under capital market pressures are likely to prefer 
short-term objectives to show immediate results, rather than long-term objectives that 
may imply a risk on the short run. In this context, executives are likely to focus on 
strategies that can be considered as risk-averse (Sundaramurthy et al., 1997), which may 
not be optimal for shareholders’ wealth (Baysinger et al., 1991). On the contrary, 
entrenched CEOs are less likely to be removed, so that they can better focus on long-
term decisions (Johnson and Rao, 1997). Income smoothing represents the earnings 
management tool that better fits entrenched CEOs’ expectations, because CEOs 
perceive it as able to satisfy long-term objectives. According to a survey conducted by 
Graham et al. (2005), CFOs smooth income to ease analysts’ task of predicting future 
earnings. Furthermore, in this survey managers argue that, in presence of smoother 
earnings, investors demand less risk premium, resulting in lower cost of equity and debt. 
We then expect that the more entrenched the CEOs, the more they are likely to engage 
in income smoothing. 
 
H1: CEOs’ entrenchment is positively associated with income smoothing. 
 
If CEOs are not entrenched, they are expected to provide signals about their ability 
to keep their position. To reach this objective, they may increase such a signal even at 
the expense of future firms’ profit. In this case, CEOs are likely to distort information by 
manipulating either discretionary accruals, or real operations at the expense of long-term 
 58 
 
profits (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2009). Typically, takeovers are more likely to occur 
when the difference between the future value of the firm and the current share value is 
high. To reduce the probability of takeovers, CEOs can either reduce firm’s future value, 
or increase the current share value. CEOs reduce future firm’s value because “the fear of 
takeover cause[s] managers to behave myopically and therefore to sacrifice long-term 
benefits to increase short-term profits” (Jensen, 1988: 25). Real activities manipulation 
has the effects of increasing current earnings, decreasing long-term firm value and, thus, 
making the firm less attractive. Alternatively, CEOs can increase current share value 
through discretionary accruals, which temporarily improve firm’s performance without 
decreasing long-term firm value. 
 
H2: CEOs’ entrenchment is negatively associated with discretionary accruals. 
 
H3: CEOs’ entrenchment is negatively associated with real activities 
manipulation. 
 
3.3.2. Entrenched CEOs’ usage of earnings management tools and subsequent firm 
operating performance 
Entrenched CEOs’ usage of earnings management tools is likely to affect subsequent 
operating performance. Entrenched CEOs are less likely than non-entrenched CEOs to 
engage in earnings management tools that are detrimental to future operating 
performance, such as discretionary accruals and, especially, real activities manipulation. 
Discretionary accruals used to increase current earnings will subsequently reduce 
earnings in the coming years. Real activities manipulation directly affects cash flows 
and, thus, future firm value. For example, aggressive price discounts or more lenient 
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credit terms increase the probability of lower future cash flows (Roychowdhury, 2006). 
However, entrenched CEOs are likely to engage more aggressively in income 
smoothing, which can be less detrimental to firm value. Although part of the literature 
argues that income smoothing increases earnings opacity (Bhattacharya et al., 2003), 
further amplifies the conflict of interests between managers and shareholders (Leuz et 
al., 2003), and cannot be associated neither to average stock returns (McInnis, 2010), 
nor to future firm value (Rountree et al., 2008), other authors argue that income 
smoothing is beneficial to shareholders because it has positive long-term effects, such as 
a decrease of the cost of borrowing (Trueman and Titman, 1988), and because it allows 
managers to provide information about their expectations of future earnings (Tucker and 
Zarowin, 2006). Because entrenched CEOs are those that are less likely to engage in 
earnings management tools that can harm future firm operating performance, we expect 
that entrenchment is positively associated to subsequent operating performance. 
 
H4: CEOs’ entrenchment is positively associated with subsequent operating 
performance. 
 
3.4. Data, variable definitions, and methods 
3.4.1. Data 
To test our hypotheses we use a sample of US firms for the period 1992-2006. We 
collect accounting data from the Compustat annual industrial and research files. Data 
about internal control and compensation mechanisms are taken from the Compustat 
Executive Compensation (ExecuComp) dataset. We collect the data about stock returns 
from CRSP. We exclude firms in regulated industries (SIC codes between 4400 and 
5000), and financial institutions (SIC codes between 6000 and 6500). We also exclude 
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each firm-year observation that has not the data necessary to calculate all the earnings 
management proxies. The final sample consists of 11,802 firm-year observations, 
corresponding to 1,714 different firms. 
 
3.4.2. Measurement of earnings management tools 
We separately estimate three different earnings management tools: Income 
smoothing, discretionary accruals, and real activities manipulation. 
We measure income smoothing as the standard deviation of net income (annual 
Compustat data item #18), scaled by beginning total assets (annual Compustat data item 
#6), divided by the standard deviation of cash flows from operations (annual Compustat 
data item #308), scaled by beginning total assets (annual Compustat data item #6) 
(Francis et al., 2004). To compute income smoothing, we use rolling firm-specific three-
year windows. According to this measure, the smaller the value of the measure, the 
smoother the income stream. To ease the interpretation, we use the reciprocal of this 
measure, that we denote as IS. 
Discretionary accruals (DA) are the firm-specific discretionary portion of total 
accruals. We estimate discretionary accruals by using the forward-looking discretionary 
accruals model of Dechow et al. (2003). This model is a modified version of the popular 
Jones (1991) model, and takes into account the non-discretionary portion of changes in 
accounts receivable, previous amounts of total accruals, and future sales growth. 
Discretionary accruals are the residuals from the estimation of the following expression: 
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where i indicates the firm, t the year, TACC represents total accruals, computed as the 
difference between net income before extraordinary items and cash flows from 
operations (annual Compustat data item #18 – annual Compustat data item #308), A is  
total assets (annual Compustat data item #6), ∆Sales is the change in net sales (annual 
Compustat data item #12), ∆REC is change in accounts receivables (annual Compustat 
data item #302), PPE is gross property, plant and equipment (annual Compustat data 
item #7) and GR_Sales is the change in sales from current year to the following year. k 
captures the expected change in accounts receivable for a given change in sales. This 
coefficient is computed by running the following regression for each 2-digit SIC code 
and year: 
 
ititSaleskREC εα +∆+=∆ 1         (2) 
 
The mean (median) of the coefficient is equal to 0.1630 (0.1256). 2 
To analyze the association between real activities manipulation and CEOs’ 
entrenchment, we focus on one specific type of distortion from the normal operational 
practices: The manipulation of sales. Following Roychowdhury (2006), to estimate the 
manipulation of sales we use the following model: 
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 As in Dechow et al. (2003), the negative values of k are re-coded as zero. 
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where CFO is cash flow from operations (annual Compustat data item #308), A is total 
assets (annual Compustat data item #6), and S is sales (annual Compustat data item 
#12). This model is estimated for each year t and for every industry classified by its 2-
digit SIC code. To disentangle the effects that other kinds of real activities manipulation 
can have on operating cash flows, we add to CFO the difference between the medians 
by year and by sector of the discretionary expenses scaled by beginning total assets and 
the actual firms’ discretionary expenses scaled by beginning total assets. In this way, 
CFOs are more likely to be free from the increasing effects that the manipulation of 
discretionary expenses has on cash flows. We then obtain our proxy for real activities 
manipulation by re-running Equation (2) using this alternative definition of CFOs. Our 
final proxy for sales manipulation is the residual of the model. The smaller the value of 
the residual, the higher the distortion of operational practices, as firms artificially 
increasing sales volume present a level of cash flow unusually lower than the rest of the 
firms. We multiply the residual by minus one, denote it RAM, and use it as our main 
proxy for real activities manipulation. 
To measure the effects that both earnings management tools and CEOs’ 
entrenchment have on subsequent operating performance, we use subsequent return on 
assets (ROA) defined as earnings before extraordinary items, divided by beginning total 
assets. 
 
3.4.3. Measurement of entrenchment and internal governance 
We measure entrenchment and internal corporate governance characteristics by 
using a composite measure for each of the two attributes. The use of indices instead of 
individual provisions of both entrenchment and internal corporate governance 
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characteristics is expected to decrease the noise that these individual proxies are likely 
to have. 
We measure CEOs’ entrenchment with a composite index composed of three 
proxies for entrenchment: CEO tenure, the entrenchment index proposed by Bebchuk et 
al. (2008), and managerial ownership. 
1) CEO tenure: CEOs’ entrenchment increases over time (Shen, 2003). At the 
beginning of their tenure, CEOs need to develop their leadership skills to meet the 
demand of their new job. Later, the probability of managerial opportunism 
increases. Fredrickson et al. (1988) argue that early vulnerability occurs when CEO 
tenure is less than, or equal to, three years. After three years, CEOs start gaining 
power and becoming more entrenched. We then construct a dummy variable taking 
value 1 if CEO tenure is greater than 3, and 0 otherwise. 
2) Entrenchment index: Starting from the popular G-index elaborated by Gompers et 
al. (2003), Bebchuck et al. (2008) investigate the importance of the twenty-four 
provisions included in this index and conclude that most of the provisions represent 
noise. They state that six provisions (staggered boards, limits to shareholders 
amendments of bylaws, supermajority requirements for mergers, supermajority 
requirements for charter amendments, poison pills, and golden parachutes) of the 
original twenty-four are mainly responsible for the associations between the G-
index and firm value. They then propose a new index, which they call 
Entrenchment index, or E-index, that includes only these six provisions and that 
ranges between 0 to 6. The higher the value, the more entrenched the managers. We 
use this index as a proxy of CEOs’ entrenchment by computing a dummy variable 
that takes the value of 1 if the E-index is greater than 3, and 0 otherwise. 
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3) Equity stocks: Previous literature (De Miguel et al., 2004) argues that CEOs are 
more entrenched at an intermediate level of managerial ownership. When CEOs’ 
ownership is below a lower bound, capital market can easily force CEOs to satisfy 
shareholders’ interests. If CEOs’ ownership is higher than an upper bound, 
managers’ interests are likely to be aligned to those of shareholders. By using, as a 
proxy of managerial ownership, the number of shares owned by CEOs through 
firms’ compensation mechanisms, divided by the number of firms’ common shares 
outstanding, we replicate the model of De Miguel et al. (2004), which relates firm 
value to managerial ownership. Size, leverage and investments are used as control 
variables. We obtain that firm value decreases in the range between 20.28% and 
66.83% of CEOs’ ownership. Managerial ownership values within this range 
correspond to the entrenchment area. Thus, we construct a dummy variable that 
takes the value of 1 if the proportion of CEOs’ shares over total shares of the firm 
falls into this range, and 0 otherwise. 
The index (Entrenchment) is computed by adding one point for each dummy 
variable taking the value of 1. Thus, the proxy Entrenchment goes from 0 (all the three 
dummy variables are equal to 0) to 3 (all the dummy variables are equal to 1). 
To construct the composite measure of internal corporate governance, we use three 
corporate governance characteristics: Board independence, number of board meetings, 
and CEO non-duality. 
1) Board independence: Our proxy for board independence is related to the presence 
of independent directors on the board. Previous literature shows that the 
composition of the board positively influence board decisions. Weisbach (1988) 
observes that the presence of independent directors is positively associated to 
boards’ decisions of CEOs’ removal. Byrd and Hickman (1992) find that in 
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successful tender offers, bidding firms with a majority of outside directors perform 
better than those with a majority of inside directors. In our model, we use a dummy 
variable that takes the value of 1 if the ratio of the number of executives that are not 
members of the board, divided by the total number of executives, is greater than 
0.50, and 0 otherwise. 
2) Number of board meetings: It is argued (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992), that directors 
which meet often are more likely to perform in accordance to shareholders’ 
interests. In our model, we use a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the 
number of board meetings is equal to, or greater than, the mean, computed by 
sector, and 0 otherwise. 
3) Non-duality: According to the agency theory, CEO duality tends to favor CEO 
entrenchment and, as a consequence, the CEOs’ opportunistic behavior that reduces 
shareholders wealth (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Thus, CEO duality can be 
interpreted as a signal of separation between ownership and control (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983). As a proxy for CEO non-duality, we construct a dummy variable that 
takes the value of 1 if the CEO and chairperson positions are not held by one 
individual, and 0 otherwise. 
We then compute a composite corporate governance index (Corp_Gov) by adding one 
point for each observation in which the dummy variables used as proxies for corporate 
governance take the value of 1. Thus, the measure Corp_Gov can take a value between 0 
and 3. 
We use several control variables that are likely to determine firms’ earnings 
management. To control for the other anti-takeover provisions that are part of the G-
index but that are not included in the E-index, we include in the model these other 
provisions (O-index), computed as the difference between the G-index and the E-index 
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for each firm-year observation. To take into account firms’ financial structure (DeFond 
and Jimbalvo, 1994; Minton and Schrand, 1999), we use leverage, computed as the ratio 
of total liabilities to total assets. We use current ROA, measured as the ratio of income 
before extraordinary items to beginning total assets, to control for current firms’ 
performance that can partly determine current earnings management (Kothari et al., 
2005), and future operating performance (Bens et al., 2002). We measure growth 
opportunities through the book-to-market ratio, computed as the book value of assets to 
the market value of equity, to take into account the incentives growth opportunities may 
provide to manipulate earnings (Graham et al., 2005; Skinner and Sloan, 2002) and their 
effects on future ROA. We measure firm size through the logarithm of total assets, as 
larger firms face more political costs (Watts and Zimmermann, 1990) and are likely to 
manipulate earnings to reduce undesired visibility. Firm size is also likely to positively 
influence future ROA (Berger and Ofek, 1995). Riskier firms are expected to 
manipulate earnings more to cover their real risk and to negatively influence firms’ 
future operating performance. As a proxy for risk we use the standard deviation of CFO 
over three-year rolling windows. Current stock prices are likely to positively influence 
future earnings (Kothari and Sloan, 1992) and to condition earnings management 
choice. To control for trends in stock prices, we include the one-year holding period 
return on investment in firms’ common stock. 
 
3.4.4. Research design 
To test the hypotheses about the direct associations between CEOs entrenchment 
and earnings management tools (H1, H2 and H3), we use the following OLS estimation 
model: 
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The variable Manipulation is separately estimated for income smoothing, 
discretionary accruals, and real activities manipulation. Entrenchment is the composite 
measure of CEOs entrenchment. Corp_Gov is the internal corporate governance index. 
Controls designates the control variables. 
To study the effects that each manipulation tool has on future operating 
performance, we use the following model: 
 
ititjjititjti ControlsROAonManipulatiROA εβββα +Σ+++=+ ,21,    (5) 
 
ROA i,t+j represents the future operating performance of firm i at time j, where j can take 
the value of 1 or 2. Current ROA controls for time series properties and current 
performance. Following Gunny (2005), we also check the effects of the persistence of 
current ROA for earnings management tools on future ROA through the following 
model: 
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The interaction term in Equation (6) controls for the effects that earnings management 
tools have on future ROA, by taking into account the persistent effect that current ROA 
is likely to have on the result. 
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Finally, to test the association between entrenchment and subsequent operating 
performance (H4), we use Equations (5) and (6) by replacing the earnings management 
proxies with the variable Entrenchment. Thus, the models take the following 
specifications: 
 
ititjjititjti ControlsROAntEntrenchmeROA εβββα +Σ+++=+ ,21,    (7) 
ititjj
ititititjti
Controls
ROAntEntrenchmeROAntEntrenchmeROA
εβ
βββα
+Σ+
+×+++=+
,
321,
 (8) 
 
3.5. Results 
3.5.1. Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics. Income smoothing has a mean equal to 
2.1345, meaning that the variability in operating cash flows is greater than the 
variability in net income The proxy of income smoothing is the reciprocal of the ratio 
between the variability of the standard deviation of net income before extraordinary 
items divided by beginning total assets, and the standard deviation of cash flow from 
operations divided by beginning total assets. The mean of this ratio (which is not 
reported in Table 1) is equal to 1.3536, which is similar to the mean of previous papers 
(Zarowin, 2002). The variable Entrenchment is skewed right, meaning that most of the 
observations are concentrated on the left. Actually, only the 16.76% of the sample has a 
value of Entrenchment equal to, or greater than, 2. The variable Corp_gov is skewed 
left, meaning that most of the firms have few strong corporate governance 
characteristics. In fact, the 42.60% of firms in the sample has a value of Corp_gov 
greater than, or equal to, 2. Table 2 reports the correlation matrix. In general, there is no 
high correlation between the independent variables used in our models. Entrenchment 
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has significant and positive correlation with income smoothing, a negative and 
significant correlation with real activities manipulation, and a non-significant correlation 
with discretionary accruals. Also, Entrenchment is negatively correlated to Corp_gov, 
meaning that stronger internal corporate governance is likely to lead to less entrenched 
CEOs, and positively correlated to current ROA. The composite index for internal 
control has negative and significant correlation with both income smoothing and 
discretionary accruals, and a positive and significant correlation with real activities 
manipulation. Current ROA has a positive and significant correlation with income 
smoothing and discretionary accruals, and a negative and significant correlation with 
real activities manipulation. 
 
3.5.2. The relation between entrenchment and earnings management tools  
The three Panels in Table 3 report results from estimating Equation (4) for each 
earnings management tool. The number of observations decreases with respect to the 
available firm-year observations because of the match with the antitakeover provisions 
data and varies depending on the earnings management tool used as dependent variable, 
as each proxy has different missing values. 
Entrenchment is positively related to income smoothing, confirming that entrenched 
CEOs tend to smooth income to achieve long-term objectives. On the contrary, internal 
corporate governance has a negative and significant association with income smoothing, 
showing that internal control mechanisms limit the use of income smoothing. 
Discretionary accruals have a negative association with both entrenchment and internal 
corporate governance characteristics. Results support the hypothesis that entrenched 
CEOs engage less in discretionary accruals than market-pressured CEOs, who are more 
likely to use this earnings management tool to provide short-term signals to the capital 
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markets. Also, the negative association between internal corporate governance 
characteristics and discretionary accruals confirms that stronger internal control reduces 
short-tem accounting manipulation (Klein, 2002; Xie et al., 2003; Ahmed and 
Duellman, 2007; Garcia Lara et al., 2009). The association between real activities 
manipulation and entrenchment is negative and significant, which means that 
entrenched CEOs engage less in sales manipulation. Internal corporate governance 
characteristics are positively related to real activities manipulation. As this manipulation 
tool is more difficult to be detected, stronger internal controls decrease accounting 
manipulation, but they are likely to have the undesired effect of leading CEOs to 
manipulate operational practices. Both univariate and multivariate analyses support the 
findings above. 
 
3.5.3. The effects of earnings management tools on future performance 
Panels A, B and C of Table 4 report results from Equations (5) and (6), used to 
study the effects of each earnings management tool on subsequent operating 
performance. We do study the performance effects directly (Equation 5) and through the 
effects over the persistence of ROA (Equation 6). Table 4, Panel A, shows results using 
income smoothing (IS) as the earnings management tool. In the model without the 
interaction term, income smoothing is positively related to ROA both at year t+1 and at 
year t+2. When the interaction term is included, the coefficient of income smoothing 
becomes negative and significant, and current ROA positively moderates the association 
between income smoothing and future ROAs. We can conclude that, in general, income 
smoothing has not a negative effect on future operating performance. 
Table 4, Panel B, shows results using discretionary accruals (DA). Results from 
Equation (5) show that discretionary accruals have a negative impact on future operating 
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performance. When Equation (6) is applied, the coefficient of discretionary accruals 
remains negative and significant, but the persistence effect that current ROA has on 
ROA both at time t+1 and at time t+2 is no longer significant. 
Finally, Table 4, Panel C considers the case of sales manipulation (RAM). Without 
the interaction term, the coefficient of sales manipulation is negative and significant 
both at time t+1 and at time t+2. Unlike discretionary accruals, the persistence of ROA 
for real activities manipulation, represented by the interaction term, is negative and 
significant. If the moderator effects of current levels of ROA are taken into account, 
sales manipulation negatively influences future firm operating performance more than 
discretionary accruals. 
 
3.5.4. The effects of CEO’s entrenchment on future performance 
Table 5 reports results of Equations (7) and (8), in which the association between 
entrenchment and subsequent operating performance is considered. Without the 
interaction effect, CEOs’ entrenchment is positively associated with ROA both at time 
t+1 and at time t+2. If the persistence effect of current ROA is included, the coefficients 
of the variable Entrenchment become negative and significant. However, current ROA 
positively moderates the association between CEOs’ entrenchment and operating 
performance in the two following periods. Results from Equation (8) show that the 
association between entrenchment and subsequent ROAs is positive when the moderator 
effect of current ROA is not considered, and positive and with a greater coefficient if the 
persistence of ROA is taken into account in the determination of the results. This is 
consistent with our hypothesis stating that entrenchment is positively associated with 
subsequent operating performance (H4), because entrenched CEOs are less likely to 
engage in earnings management tools that are more detrimental to firm performance. 
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3.5.5. Sensitivity checks 
We alternatively measure income smoothing as the correlation between changes in 
accruals and changes in operating cash flows (Leuz et al., 2003). To calculate this, we 
use rolling firm-specific three-year windows. The expected sign of this correlation is 
negative (Dechow, 1994), and larger magnitudes of the negative correlation indicate 
smoothing of reported earnings that does not reflect the actual economic performance 
(Leuz et al., 2003). To ease the interpretation of our second proxy of income smoothing, 
we multiply the correlation by (-1), so that the greater the value, the smoother the 
income. As an alternative proxy of discretionary accruals, we use the Jones (1991) 
model. Using this proxy as the dependent variable in Equation (4), our main inferences 
do not change. 
We construct different specifications of the composite variables of entrenchment and 
internal corporate governance characteristics by constructing dummies based on means 
and medians, computed by sector, of the single entrenchment and governance 
provisions. Results are qualitatively similar. 
Further sensitivity checks include the use year and sector dummies in the estimation 
models (first separately, and then jointly) and adjustments of the models by using 
clustered standard errors for year or sector. Results are similar to those described above. 
 
3.6. Conclusions and further research 
Although part of the literature argues that managerial entrenchment amplifies the 
conflict of interests between CEOs and shareholders, an alternative stream of research 
suggests that managerial entrenchment help reduce managers’ “myopia”. We contribute 
to this stream of literature by showing that entrenched CEOs are less likely to engage in 
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discretionary accruals and in real activities manipulation. We also show that entrenched 
CEOs engage more aggressively in income smoothing. While academics do not 
uniquely agree about the effects that income smoothing has on future firm performance, 
discretionary accruals and, especially, real activities manipulation are detrimental to 
future firm performance. As a consequence, we show that CEOs’ entrenchment is 
generally positively related to future performance. 
Further research could focus on how market participants (i.e. investors and analysts) 
consider CEO entrenchment. If investors and analysts are aware that entrenchment can 
reduce managerial myopia, they may hold a less negative view of managerial 
entrenchment. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
Variables 25th percentile Mean Median 75th percentile Standard deviation 
CFO 0.0612 0.1167 0.1132 0.1706 0.1215 
TACC -0.0969 -0.0645 -0.0552 -0.0199 0.1750 
Leverage 0.3558 0.5062 0.5149 0.6429 0.2238 
ROA 0.0194 0.0522 0.0615 0.1079 0.2012 
IS 0.7071 2.1345 1.3073 2.5138 2.5214 
DA -0.0239 -0.0007 0 0.0304 0.1109 
RAM -0.1083 -0.0081 -0.0085 0.0772 0.1753 
Entrenchment 0 0.9112 1 1 0.6514 
Corp_gov 1 1.3533 1 2 0.8684 
 
The number of firm-year observations is equal to 9,739. CFO is operating cash flow, scaled by beginning 
total assets; TACC is total accruals, scaled by beginning total assets; Leverage is the ratio between total 
liabilities and total assets; ROA is the ratio between income before extraordinary assets and beginning 
total assets; IS is income smoothing, computed as the reciprocal of the ratio of firm i’s standard deviation 
of net income before extraordinary items divided by beginning total assets, to its standard deviation of 
cash flow from operations divided by beginning total assets, calculated over rolling three-year windows; 
DA is discretionary accruals, computed through the forward-looking discretionary accruals model, as in 
Dechow et al. (2003); RAM is real activities manipulation, computed as the inverted sign of sales 
manipulation proxy (Roychowdhury, 2006), in which the CFOs scaled by beginning total assets used to 
run the model are equal to the sum between the original CFOs scaled by beginning total assets, and the 
difference between the median by year and by sector of discretionary expenses scaled by beginning total 
assets and discretionary expenses scaled by beginning total assets of each firm-year observation; 
Entrenchment is a composite measure and is the sum of three dummy variables, where each refers to an 
entrenchment proxy (CEO tenure, Entrenchment index, and managerial entrenchment); Corp_gov is a 
composite measure that is the sum of three dummy variables for internal corporate governance 
characteristics (board independence, number of board meetings, CEO non-duality). 
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Table 2 – Correlation matrix 
 CFO TACC Leverage ROA IS DA RAM Entrenchment Corp_gov 
CFO 1 
   
 
    
TACC -0.1147 1        
Leverage -0.1501 -0.0027 1       
ROA 0.5039 0.8002 -0.0929 1      
IS 0.0529 0.0761 0.0076 0.0977 1     
DA -0.0076 0.8680 -0.0095 0.6607 0.0464 1    
RAM -0.2665 0.0489 0.0441 -0.1780 -0.0612 0.0566 1   
Entrenchment 0.0162 0.0355 0.0019 0.0407 0.0514 -0.0045 -0.0263 1  
Corp_gov -0.0488 -0.0596 0.0181 -0.0812 -0.0870 -0.0380 0.0785 -0.2094 1 
 
Pairwise Spearman correlations. Correlations in bold are significant at the 10% level. 
 
The number of firm-year observations is equal to 9,739. CFO is operating cash flow, scaled by beginning total assets; TACC is total accruals, scaled by beginning total assets; 
Leverage is the ratio between total liabilities and total assets; ROA is the ratio between income before extraordinary assets and beginning total assets; IS is income smoothing, 
computed as the reciprocal of the ratio of firm i’s standard deviation of net income before extraordinary items divided by beginning total assets, to its standard deviation of 
cash flow from operations divided by beginning total assets, calculated over rolling three-year windows; DA is discretionary accruals, computed through the forward-looking 
discretionary accruals model, as in Dechow et al. (2003); RAM is real activities manipulation, computed as the inverted sign of sales manipulation proxy (Roychowdhury, 
2006), in which the CFOs scaled by beginning total assets used to run the model are equal to the sum between the original CFOs scaled by beginning total assets, and the 
difference between the median by year and by sector of discretionary expenses scaled by beginning total assets and discretionary expenses scaled by beginning total assets of 
each firm-year observation; Entrenchment is a composite measure and is the sum of three dummy variables, where each refers to an entrenchment proxy (CEO tenure, 
Entrenchment index, and equity stocks); Corp_gov is a composite measure that is the sum of three dummy variables for internal corporate governance characteristics (board 
independence, number of board meetings, CEO non-duality). 
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Table 3: The associations between earnings management tools and CEOs’ entrenchment 
 
 Accounting manipulation   Real activities manipulation 
 Panel A: Income smoothing   Panel B: Discretionary accruals  Panel C: Sales manipulation 
 IS IS IS  DA DA DA  RAM RAM RAM 
Intercept -0.5793*** -0.1171 -0.2216  0.0077 0.0093 0.0127**  0.0336*** 0.0069 0.0142 
 (0.00) (0.53) (0.26)  (0.19) (0.13) (0.04)  (0.01) (0.59) (0.29) 
Entrenchment
 t-1 0.1342***  0.0872*  -0.0021*  -0.0028**  -0.0082***  -0.0056* 
 (0.00)  (0.05)  (0.06)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.07) 
Corp_Gov
 t-1  -0.2105*** -0.1964***   -0.0023** -0.0028***   0.0123*** 0.0114*** 
  (0.00) (0.00)   (0.02) (0.01)   (0.00) (0.00) 
O_index
 t 0.0125 0.0175 0.0143  0.0002 0.0001 0.0002  0.0010 0.0007 0.0009 
 (0.30) (0.14) (0.24)  (0.56) (0.73) (0.50)  (0.23) (0.38) (0.26) 
Leverage
 t -0.0301 -0.0273 -0.0275  0.0031*** 0.0031*** 0.0032***  0.0327*** 0.0319*** 0.0324*** 
 (0.11) (0.15) (0.15)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
ROA
 t 3.8640*** 3.7340*** 3.7231***  0.2346*** 0.2318*** 0.2324***  -0.3045*** -0.2966*** -0.2961*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Book to market
 t 0.5277*** 0.5410*** 0.5323***  0.0209*** 0.0207*** 0.0210***  -0.0177*** -0.0179*** -0.0178*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Total Assets (ln)
 t 0.2118*** 0.2048*** 0.2080***  -0.0043*** -0.0042*** -0.0043***  -0.0055*** -0.0052*** -0.0055*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
CFO (stand.dev.)
 t 12.8623*** 12.9886*** 13.0657***  -0.0451 -0.0401 -0.0423  0.1339** 0.1296** 0.1242** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.21) (0.27) (0.24)  (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) 
Return
 t 0.1351** 0.1433*** 0.1428***  -0.0075*** -0.0074*** -0.0074***  0.0063 0.0059 0.0059 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.17) (0.19) (0.19) 
Observations 7251 7251 7251  6922 6922 6922  7564 7564 7564 
R2 0.062 0.065 0.066  0.085 0.086 0.087  0.046 0.048 0.048 
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p-values in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 4 reports univariate and multivariate results from the following OLS estimation model: 
ititjjtitiit ControlsGovCorpntEntrenchmeonManipulati εβββα +Σ+++= −− ,1,21,1 _  
IS is income smoothing, computed as the reciprocal of the ratio of firm i’s standard deviation of net income before extraordinary items divided by beginning total assets, to its 
standard deviation of cash flow from operations divided by beginning total assets, calculated over rolling three-year windows; DA is discretionary accruals, computed through 
the forward-looking discretionary accruals model, as in Dechow et al. (2003); RAM is real activities manipulation, computed as the inverted sign of sales manipulation proxy 
(Roychowdhury, 2006), in which the CFOs scaled by beginning total assets used to run the model are equal to the sum between the original CFOs scaled by beginning total 
assets, and the difference between the median by year and by sector of discretionary expenses scaled by beginning total assets and discretionary expenses scaled by beginning 
total assets of each firm-year observation; Entrenchment is a composite measure that adds one for each observation in which the three dummy variables for entrenchment takes 
the value of 1; Corp_gov is a composite measure that adds one for each observation in which the three dummy variables for internal corporate governance characteristics takes 
the value of 1; O_index is computed as the difference between the G-index and the E-index; Leverage is the ratio between total liabilities and total assets. ROA is the ratio 
between income before extraordinary assets and beginning total assets; Book to market is is the ratio of book value of assets to the market value of equity; Total assets (ln) is 
the natural logarithm of firms’ total assets; CFO (sd) is the standard deviation of operating cash flows computed by using rolling firm-specific three-year windows; Return is 
the one-year holding period return of the investment in the common stock of firm i. 
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Table 4 – Panel A: The associations between subsequent operating performance and 
income smoothing 
 ROA
 t+1 ROA t+1 ROA t+2 ROA t+2 
     
Intercept 0.0567*** 0.0464*** 0.0487*** 0.0402*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
IS
 t 0.0024*** -0.0075*** 0.0023*** -0.0060*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
ROA
 t 0.2777*** 0.2171*** 0.1873** 0.1391* 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.02) (0.05) 
IS
 t *ROA t  0.1136***  0.0932*** 
  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Leverage
 t -0.0049*** -0.0029*** -0.0044*** -0.0027*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Book to market
 t -0.0450*** -0.0325*** -0.0417*** -0.0313*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Total Assets (ln)
 t 0.0018* 0.0027*** 0.0038*** 0.0045*** 
 (0.06) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
CFO (stand.dev.)
 t -0.2622*** -0.2315*** -0.2896*** -0.2641*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Return
 t 0.0353*** 0.0352*** 0.0138*** 0.0134*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Observations 10627 10627 10009 10009 
R2 0.282 0.315 0.156 0.179 
 
p-values in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 4, Panel A, reports results from the following OLS estimation models: 
ititjjititjti ControlsROAonManipulatiROA εβββα +Σ+++=+ ,21,  
ititjjititititjti ControlsROAonManipulatiROAonManipulatiROA εββββα +Σ+×+++=+ ,321,  
ROA is income before extraordinary items, divided by beginning total assets; IS is income smoothing, 
computed as the reciprocal of the ratio of firm i’s standard deviation of net income before extraordinary 
items divided by beginning total assets, to its standard deviation of cash flow from operations divided by 
beginning total assets, calculated over rolling three-year windows; Leverage is the ratio between total 
liabilities and total assets; Book to market is the ratio of book value of assets to the market value of equity; 
Total assets (ln) is the natural logarithm of firms’ total assets; CFO (sd) is the standard deviation of operating 
cash flows computed by using rolling firm-specific three-year windows; Return is the one-year holding 
period return of the investment in the common stock of firm i. 
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Table 4 – Panel B: The associations between subsequent operating performance and 
discretionary accruals 
 ROA
 t+1 ROA t+1 ROA t+2 ROA t+2 
     
Intercept 0.0280*** 0.0271*** 0.0295*** 0.0317*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
DA
 t -0.1875*** -0.1927*** -0.1364*** -0.1228*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
ROA
 t 0.6429*** 0.6464*** 0.4714*** 0.4625*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
DA
 t *ROA t  0.1637  -0.3842 
  (0.56)  (0.19) 
Leverage
 t -0.0008 -0.0008 -0.0008 -0.0008 
 (0.30) (0.31) (0.36) (0.33) 
Book to market
 t -0.0217*** -0.0214*** -0.0215*** -0.0223*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Total Assets (ln)
 t 0.0005 0.0006 0.0022** 0.0021** 
 (0.56) (0.54) (0.01) (0.02) 
CFO (stand.dev.)
 t -0.1522*** -0.1525*** -0.1666*** -0.1651*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Return
 t 0.0248*** 0.0250*** 0.0071** 0.0066** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.03) 
Observations 9119 9119 7867 7867 
R2 0.407 0.408 0.232 0.233 
 
p-values in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 4, Panel B, reports results from the following OLS estimation models: 
ititjjititjti ControlsROAonManipulatiROA εβββα +Σ+++=+ ,21,  
ititjjititititjti ControlsROAonManipulatiROAonManipulatiROA εββββα +Σ+×+++=+ ,321,  
ROA is income before extraordinary items, divided by beginning total assets; DA id discretionary accruals, 
computed through the forward-looking discretionary accruals model, as in Dechow et al. (2003); Leverage is 
the ratio between total liabilities and total assets; Book to market is the ratio of book value of assets to the 
market value of equity; Total assets (ln) is the natural logarithm of firms’ total assets; CFO (sd) is the 
standard deviation of operating cash flows computed by using rolling firm-specific three-year windows; 
Return is the one-year holding period return of the investment in the common stock of firm i. 
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Table 4 – Panel C: The associations between subsequent operating performance and 
real activities manipulation 
 ROA
 t+1 ROA t+1 ROA t+2 ROA t+2 
     
Intercept 0.0594*** 0.0382*** 0.0506*** 0.0316*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
RAM
 t -0.0293*** -0.0109 -0.0187** -0.0027 
 (0.00) (0.29) (0.05) (0.77) 
ROA
 t 0.2733*** 0.4718*** 0.1865** 0.3573*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) 
RAM
 t *ROA t  -0.1589***  -0.1331*** 
  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Leverage
 t -0.0051*** -0.0025** -0.0045*** -0.0024** 
 (0.00) (0.04) (0.00) (0.01) 
Book to market
 t -0.0458*** -0.0316*** -0.0420*** -0.0295*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Total Assets (ln)
 t 0.0021** 0.0017* 0.0041*** 0.0038*** 
 (0.03) (0.05) (0.00) (0.00) 
CFO (stand.dev.)
 t -0.2301*** -0.2179*** -0.2501*** -0.2416*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Return
 t 0.0356*** 0.0310*** 0.0139*** 0.0099*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Observations 10744 10744 10123 10123 
R2 0.281 0.339 0.155 0.199 
 
p-values in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 4, Panel C, reports results from the following OLS estimation models: 
ititjjititjti ControlsROAonManipulatiROA εβββα +Σ+++=+ ,21,  
ititjjititititjti ControlsROAonManipulatiROAonManipulatiROA εββββα +Σ+×+++=+ ,321,  
ROA is income before extraordinary items, divided by beginning total assets; RAM is real activities 
manipulation, computed as the inverted sign of sales manipulation proxy (Roychowdhury, 2006), in which 
the CFOs scaled by beginning total assets used to run the model are equal to the sum between the original 
CFOs scaled by beginning total assets, and the difference between the median by year and by sector of 
discretionary expenses scaled by beginning total assets and discretionary expenses scaled by beginning total 
assets of each firm-year observation; Leverage is the ratio between total liabilities and total assets; Book to 
market is the ratio of book value of assets to the market value of equity; Total assets (ln) is the natural 
logarithm of firms’ total assets; CFO (sd) is the standard deviation of operating cash flows computed by 
using rolling firm-specific three-year windows; Return is the one-year holding period return of the 
investment in the common stock of firm i. 
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Table 5: The associations between subsequent operating performance and CEOs’ 
entrenchment 
 ROA
 t+1 ROA t+1 ROA t+2 ROA t+2 
     
Intercept 0.0379*** 0.0417*** 0.0389*** 0.0412*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Entrenchment
 t 0.0032** -0.0109** 0.0022 -0.0097*** 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.22) (0.01) 
ROA
 t 0.2220*** 0.1389*** 0.1271** 0.0605* 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.04) (0.07) 
Entrenchment
 t *ROA t  0.2115***  0.1732*** 
  (0.00)  (0.00) 
O_index
 t 0.0016*** 0.0018*** 0.0029*** 0.0031*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Leverage
 t -0.0066*** -0.0046*** -0.0059*** -0.0043*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Book to market
 t -0.0719*** -0.0608*** -0.0656*** -0.0563*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Total Assets (ln)
 t 0.0058*** 0.0046*** 0.0054*** 0.0046*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
CFO (stand.dev.)
 t -0.2038*** -0.1916*** -0.2095*** -0.1949*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Return
 t 0.0338*** 0.0323*** 0.0108*** 0.0094*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Observations 8208 8208 7211 7211 
R2 0.275 0.307 0.147 0.173 
 
p-values in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 5 reports results from the following OLS estimation models: 
ititjjititjti ControlsROAntEntrenchmeROA εβββα +Σ+++=+ ,21,  
ititjjititititjti ControlsROAntEntrenchmeROAntEntrenchmeROA εββββα +Σ+×+++=+ ,321,  
ROA is income before extraordinary items, divided by beginning total assets; Entrenchment is a composite 
measure that adds one for each observation in which the three dummy variables for entrenchment takes the 
value of 1; Leverage is the ratio between total liabilities and total assets; Book to market is the ratio of book 
value of assets to the market value of equity; Total assets (ln) is the natural logarithm of firms’ total assets; 
CFO (sd) is the standard deviation of operating cash flows computed by using rolling firm-specific three-year 
windows; Return is the one-year holding period return of the investment in the common stock of firm i. 
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Chapter 4 - Compensation Mechanisms, Accounting Choice, and Real Activities 
Manipulation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
CEO’s compensation mechanisms represent an attempt to overcome the conflict 
of interests between owners and managers. However, in specific situations the 
implementation of these mechanisms is likely to lead CEOs to manipulate 
earnings. While previous literature has analyzed the association between only 
some compensation mechanisms and accounting manipulation, we attempt to 
consider both a broader set of compensation mechanisms, and different ways to 
manipulate earnings (i.e., both accounting and real activities manipulation). We 
find that the choice of different manipulation tools depends partially on the 
characteristics of CEO’s compensation mechanisms. This implies that in specific 
situations, some compensation mechanisms, instead of reducing the agency 
problem by aligning the interests of CEOs to those of shareholders, may amplify it 
by affecting not only accounting quality but also efficient operational practices. 
 
 
4.1. Introduction 
Agency theory has dominated the analysis of corporate governance. Its main concern is 
the separation of ownership and control, and the possibility that managers (agents) take 
actions that hurt shareholders (principals). Managers may amass private benefits by 
building empires, maintaining costly labour, paying inflated transfer prices to affiliated 
entities, or simply exerting insufficient effort. In this context, a good governance structure 
is one that is able to align the interests of principals and agents. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) 
discussed the available mechanisms to force agents to internalize the welfare of 
shareholders, including managerial compensation mechanisms like stock options, annual 
bonuses, long-term incentive plans, equity stocks, and restricted stock grants. 
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In idiosyncratic situations, however, these compensation mechanisms may have the 
opposite effect of amplifying the agency problem. Some studies have pinpointed that, for 
example, managers may take advantage of the flexibility of accounting principles to 
influence reported earnings, thereby causing managerial compensation to be larger than it 
would otherwise be (Healy, 1985; Holthausen et al., 1995; Cheng and Warfield, 2005; 
Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006). These studies have focused on the relationship between 
particular compensation mechanisms - like stock options, annual bonuses or equity stocks 
- and accrual quality. However, they do not take into account the existence of other forms 
of manipulation. The associations between compensation mechanisms and earnings 
manipulation tools are important because each tool implies different consequences on firm 
value. In fact, while accounting manipulation satisfies both long-term (through income 
smoothing) and short-term (through discretionary accruals) objectives without affecting 
long-term firm value (Peasnell et al., 2000), real activities manipulation only achieves 
short-term objectives, as it has negative consequences on cash flows in future periods 
(Roychowdhury, 2006). 
Acknowledging the different economic consequences of alternative forms of 
manipulation, the objective of this study is to analyze the impact of a broad set of 
compensation mechanisms - stock options, annual bonuses, long-term incentive plans, 
equity stocks, and restricted stock grants – on both accounting and real activities 
manipulations. These two tools of earnings manipulation differ in terms of the specific 
items to be managed and in their economic consequences. Accounting manipulation 
consists in the manipulation of accounting numbers to mislead users of financial 
statements either through the discretionary use of accruals (Dechow and Dichev, 2002) or 
by smoothing earnings (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1995). By manipulating accounting 
numbers, CEOs can achieve both long-term and short-term objectives through income 
 88 
 
smoothing and discretionary accruals, respectively. Real activities manipulation is defined 
as “departures from normal operational practices, motivated by managers desire to mislead 
at least some stakeholders into believing certain financial reporting goals have been met in 
the normal course of operations” (Roychowdhury, 2006: 337). Because real activities 
manipulation affects long-term firm value, it is more likely to satisfy only CEOs’ short-
term objectives. As each compensation mechanism is indexed on a particular facet of 
business performance, we expect that different compensation mechanisms will lead CEOs 
to manipulate earnings through different methods.  
The hypotheses are defined by taking into account the characteristics of each 
compensation mechanism and the way they allow CEOs to increase their personal wealth 
by choosing a specific way to manipulate earnings. We argue that compensation 
mechanisms that limit CEOs’ loss from stock price declines, such as stock options, lead 
managers to engage in earnings manipulation tools that satisfy short-term objectives. 
CEOs with higher levels of stock options are then expected to engage not only in 
accounting manipulation, but also in real activities manipulation even at the expense of 
future cash flows, as they are not penalized as much as shareholders from a future firm 
value decrease. The compensation mechanisms that make CEOs’ wealth sensitive to firm 
value decreases (such as annual bonuses and equity stock) are likely to lead managers to 
engage in accounting manipulation, which temporarily affects earnings, but not firm value. 
Long-term incentives are expected to have a negative association with the manipulation of 
accruals, because the temporal increase of earnings obtained through this earnings 
manipulation tool is averaged away by the computation of the rolling-average cumulative 
performance, and with real activities manipulation, which implies a future firm value 
decrease and, therefore, a future CEO’s wealth decline. Finally, disentangling the final 
effect of restricted stock grants on earnings manipulation is an empirical issue, as the 
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incentive provided by this compensation mechanism to manipulate earnings depends on 
the combination of the CEO tenure with the date in which the restriction disappears. 
Using data from Compustat and ExecuComp from 1992 to 2006, we obtain results that 
generally support the expectations. Stock options are generally positively associated with 
the earnings manipulation proxies. Equity stocks are positively related to accounting 
manipulation and, if observable heterogeneity is not considered, to real activities 
manipulation. Annual bonuses and long-term incentives are positively associated to 
discretionary accruals. Finally, restricted stock grants are not associated with any earnings 
manipulation tool. 
The paper is organized as follows: The next section provides definitions and 
characteristics of the earnings manipulation tools. Section 3 develops the hypotheses. 
Section 4 introduces the data and describes the methodology. Section 5 presents the 
results. Section 6 concludes. 
 
4.2. Earnings manipulation 
Managers can uncover firms’ performance by manipulating earnings in different ways. 
Next, we describe how managers can achieve their financial reporting goals through 
accounting manipulation and through the manipulation of real activities. 
 
4.2.1. Accounting manipulation 
Managers can manipulate accounting numbers through two different techniques: 
income smoothing, which mainly satisfies long-term objectives, and discretionary 
decisions about accruals, which are mainly addressed at achieving short-term financial 
reporting goals. 
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The accounting manipulation through income smoothing can be defined as the 
“process of manipulating the time profile of earnings or earnings reports to make the 
reported income stream less variable” (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1995: 75). To smooth 
income, managers decrease earnings in good years, and increase it in bad years. According 
to a survey conducted by Graham et al. (2005), executives engage in income smoothing 
because smoother earnings ease the analysts’ task of predicting future earnings. 
Furthermore, in this survey CFOs argue that, in presence of smoother earnings, investors 
demand less risk premium, resulting in lower cost of equity and debt. 
The accounting manipulation through discretionary accruals is the opportunistic use of 
accruals in order to achieve short-term objectives. Accrual accounting consists in “the 
accrual and deferral of past, current and anticipated future cash receipts and 
disbursements” (Richardson et al., 2005: 441). Through accruals, earnings better reflect 
the match between the timing of accounting recognition of operations with the timing of 
their economic benefits (Dechow and Dichev, 2002). As accruals are based on 
assumptions and estimates, they can be opportunistically managed to mislead users of 
financial statements (Jones, 1991; Dechow and Dichev, 2002). CEOs engage in 
discretionary accruals to achieve accounting targets that are implicitly or explicitly 
specified in a contract (Schipper, 1989). However, accruals can be opportunistically 
managed to mainly satisfy short-term objectives, as the effect of an increase of earnings 
through the manipulation of accruals must reverse some time in the future due to the self-
reversing property of accruals. 
 
4.2.2. Real activities manipulation 
Prior literature has paid little attention to whether the existence of compensation 
mechanisms leads managers to engage in real activities manipulation, which is defined as 
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“departures from normal operational practices, motivated by managers desire to mislead at 
least some stakeholders into believing certain financial reporting goals have been met in 
the normal course of operations” (Roychowdhury, 2006: 337). For example, sales can be 
manipulated by offering more lenient credit terms. With this strategy, sales volume 
increases, but also credit risk. Also, managers can postpone the optimal level of 
discretionary expenses (such as R&D, advertising, and selling, general and administrative 
expenses) to increase current earnings, or produce more goods than necessary to lower 
fixed costs per unit (Roychowdhury, 2006). Real activities manipulation has the effect of 
reducing long-term firm’s value. Therefore, managers would choose to engage in this kind 
of manipulation if they pursue only short-term objectives. 
 
4.3. Hypotheses 
In this section, we develop hypotheses about the relationship between the different 
ways to manipulate earnings and different mechanisms of CEO compensation: Stock 
options, annual bonuses, long-term incentive plans, equity stocks, and restricted stock 
grants. Table 1 summarizes the expected associations between compensation mechanisms 
and earnings manipulation tools that are developed in this section. 
 
4.3.1. Stock options  
Stock options are contracts that give to the recipient the right to buy a share of stock at 
a pre-specified exercise price for a pre-specified term (Murphy, 1999). Executive options 
typically become exercisable over time. For example, the 25% of stock options become 
exercisable in each of the four years following the grant. The main purpose of stock 
options is to align CEOs’ interests to those of shareholders. However, the incentives from 
stock options do not mimic those of stock owners for several reasons (Murphy, 1999). 
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First, because option holders only gain from stock-price appreciation and not from total 
shareholder returns (which includes dividends), CEOs have incentives only in favouring 
share repurchases and not in increasing dividends. Second, since the value of options 
increases with stock-price volatility, executives with options have incentives to engage in 
riskier investments. Finally, the alignment between shareholders’ and CEOs’ interests 
totally disappears when the stock price falls below the exercise price, making the chance 
of exercising very little. For this last reason, option compensation makes CEO wealth a 
convex function of stock price (Burns and Kedia, 2006): Although CEOs’ benefits from an 
increase in the stock price associated with aggressive accounting, losses in CEOs’ wealth 
are limited after stock price declines. Management is rewarded in good times, but they are 
not equally penalized in bad times. 
Stock options make CEOs more interested in short-term objectives, rather than in long-
term objectives, as managers would not be penalized as much as shareholders from a 
decrease of long-term firm value. Therefore, we expect that CEOs are likely to engage in 
both discretionary accruals and real activities to increase stock price. With regards to 
income smoothing, the positive effect that smoother earnings have on option value is 
balanced by the increases of option value generated by stock price volatility.  By taking 
into account these two opposite effects, we cannot determine an ex-ante relationship 
between stock options and income smoothing.  
 
H1: Higher stock option incentives are positively associated with both 
discretionary accruals and real activities manipulation. 
 
4.3.2. Annual bonuses 
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A bonus plan is normally composed of three components: Performance measures, 
performance standards and the structure of pay-performance relation (Murphy, 1999). The 
performance measure used to fix the target is normally an accounting measure, such as 
revenues, net income, pre-tax income. The performance standards vary from plan to plan, 
and it may consist, for example, in one-year budget goals, year-to-year improvements 
based on firm’s results, standards discretionally fixed by the board of directors, or peer 
group standards. Finally, the pay-performance structure defines the performance threshold 
and the performance cap and, as a consequence, the amount to be paid to CEOs. 
The annual bonus is a compensation mechanism that is normally set as a percentage of 
salary. If a pre-specified performance is lower (greater) than the target, then such a 
percentage tends to decrease (increase) proportionally to the negative (positive) difference 
between the performance and the target. Typically, there is a minimum threshold 
(expressed as a percentage of the performance measure) under which no bonus is paid. A 
maximum of bonus paid, also called bonus cap (again, expressed as a percentage of the 
performance measure), is also normally indicated. 
Healy (1985) and Holthausen et al. (1995) show that annual bonuses lead managers to 
opportunistically engage in discretionary accruals in the case in which earnings are 
between the lower bound required to earn any bonus and the upper bound after which no 
further increases in bonuses are obtained. When earnings are below the lower bound, 
CEOs use to prefer either income smoothing or discretionary accruals. (Healy, 1985). If 
they engage in income smoothing, they are likely to decrease accruals in the current period 
and to increase them in the following period. In this way CEOs expect to gain no bonus in 
the current period and  a greater bonus in the following period. If they opportunistically 
increase earnings through discretionary accruals, they can eventually reach a certain level 
of bonus in the current period. In the case in which earnings are above the upper bound, 
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they are likely to engage in income smoothing, so that they can increase income in future 
periods and receive their annual bonus even in presence of future bad performance. 
Therefore, in general, we expect a positive relation between annual bonuses and 
accounting manipulation. Depending on the position of earnings with respect to the 
minimum threshold and the bonus cap, CEOs may prefer to opportunistically manage 
accruals achieving long- or short-term objectives by smoothing income or by managing 
earnings upwards, respectively. 
Finally, we expect a negative association between annual bonuses and real activities 
manipulation. If managers postpone the optimal amount of R&D, advertising, and selling, 
general and administrative expenditures, they are likely to reduce future earnings and the 
firms’ stock price (Holthausen et al., 1995). Therefore, managers would have a trade-off 
between current bonus effects and future bonus effects.  
 
H2: Higher annual bonus incentives are positively associated with both income 
smoothing and discretionary accruals, and negatively associated with real 
activities manipulation. 
 
4.3.3. Long-term incentives 
The structure of long-term incentives is similar to annual bonuses, but the long-term 
incentives are based on a rolling-average cumulative performance window that usually 
ranges between three and five years. Burns and Kedia (2006) argue that long-term 
incentive plans make CEO wealth a function of longer term firm value.  
The association between long-term incentives and discretionary accruals is expected to 
be negative, as the temporal increase of earnings obtained through this earnings 
manipulation tool is averaged away by the computation of the rolling-average cumulative 
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performance. Also, we expect a negative association between long-term incentives and 
real activities manipulation. In fact, real activities manipulation has the effect of 
decreasing future firms’ value and, therefore, the future pay-out of long-term incentives. 
With regards to income smoothing, two opposite effects can influence managers’ 
decisions to engage in this kind of manipulation. On the one hand, CEOs with greater 
long-term incentives are likely to engage in income smoothing to increase (decrease) 
earnings in bad (good) times, to reach low volatility of earnings and, therefore, to hit the 
pre-determined cumulative performance. On the other hand, , the interest of CEOs towards 
this kind of earnings manipulation depends on the width of the rolling-average window, as 
the longer the window, the smoother the cumulative performance, the less necessary the 
income smoothing. Due to these two opposite effects and to the fact that we cannot 
establish a priori which one prevails upon the other, we cannot determine an ex-ante 
relation between income smoothing and long-term incentives. 
 
H3: Higher long-term incentives are negatively associated with both discretionary 
accruals and real activities manipulation. 
 
4.3.4. Equity stocks 
Equity stocks tie CEOs’ wealth by exposing CEOs to price declines (Burns and Kedia, 
2006). To avoid a wealth decrease from a decline in stock price, managers are likely to 
smooth earnings. Like shareholders, CEOs conceive income smoothing as a strategy to 
lower firm risk and, therefore, to decrease both cost of equity and cost of debt (Graham et 
al., 2005). Managers are also likely to opportunistically use accruals (Bergstresser and 
Philippon, 2006; Warfield et al., 1995), to temporarily increase share price without 
decreasing long-term firm’s value. On the contrary, CEOs with a high percentage of equity 
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shares over their total compensation are not expected to engage in real activities 
manipulation as it directly affects firm’s value and, therefore, share price and CEOs’ future 
wealth. 
 
H4: Higher equity stock incentives are positively associated with both income 
smoothing and discretionary accruals, and negatively associated with real 
activities manipulation. 
 
4.3.5. Restricted stock grants 
The stock provided to the executives is sometimes restricted, in the sense that it cannot 
be sold until certain conditions are met (Murphy, 1999). These conditions normally consist 
on employee longevity, but they may alternatively be concerned with earnings per share or 
internal financial targets. Once the restriction has been overcome, the stock has the same 
value as the market price of the stock. 
The incentive provided by the restricted stock grants to manipulate earnings is not so 
straightforward, as it depends on the combination between CEO tenure and the date in 
which the restriction disappears. If CEOs are about to leave the firm and, at the same time, 
the restriction is about to be overcome, CEOs’ interest in increasing earnings manipulation 
increases as well. If CEOs do not have the intention of leaving the firm soon and, at the 
same time, restricted stock grants are not going to be vested on the short-run, managers are 
less likely to manipulate earnings. Therefore, we do not predict any ex-ante relationship 
between restricted stock grants and earnings manipulation tools. 
 
4.4. Data and methodology 
4.4.1. Data 
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We collect financial data from the Compustat annual industrial and research files, 
excluding firms in regulated industries (SIC codes between 4400 and 5000), and financial 
institutions (SIC codes between 6000 and 6500). We also require that each firm-year 
observation has the data necessary to calculate all the earnings manipulation proxies. 
Data about the compensation mechanisms are taken from the Compustat Executive 
Compensation (ExecuComp) dataset. These data are available only starting from 1992. We 
require that each observation has data about all the compensation mechanisms available. 
We winsorize variables at 1% and 99% as it is common to avoid outliers blurring the 
results. Thus, we obtain 13,364 firm-year observations from 1992 to 2006, corresponding 
to 1,647 different firms. 
 
4.4.2. Research design 
To test the hypotheses related to the associations between compensation mechanisms 
and earnings manipulation tools, we use the following specification: 
 
itiitjjitkkit uCONTROLSONCOMPENSATIONMANIPULATI '',, εββα ++Σ+Σ+=        (1) 
 
We run the model for each firm i at the time t. The dependent variable 
(MANIPULATION) is estimated separately for three earnings manipulation proxies: 
income smoothing, discretionary accruals, and real activities manipulation. 
COMPENSATION includes the compensation mechanisms: stock options, annual bonuses, 
long-term incentives, equity stocks, and restricted stock grants. CONTROLS designates the 
control variables: leverage, ROA, book-to-market ratio, total assets, standard deviation of 
CFOs. Equation (1) describes a panel data fixed effects model, where the unobservable 
heterogeneity (u’i) is taken into account (Bascle, 2008). In fact, we expect that there are 
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unobservable characteristics, such as firm culture and management ethics, that are 
determinants not only of manipulation, but also of compensation mechanisms. If these 
unobservable characteristics are not considered, compensation mechanisms may spuriously 
appear as a determinant of manipulation. 
To further mitigate possible endogeneity problems, we extend Equation (1) by 
considering not only the unobservable, but also the observable characteristics that may 
affect both compensation mechanisms and earnings manipulation. Compensation 
mechanisms depend on corporate governance (Core et al., 1999; Mehran, 1995; Conyon, 
1997; Cyert et al., 2002; Ryan and Wiggins, 2001), firm and environmental characteristics. 
Also, corporate governance characteristics have an effect on earnings quality (Klein, 2002; 
Xie et al., 2003; Ahmed and Duellman, 2007; Garcia Lara et al., 2009). To control for that, 
we add lagged variables of corporate governance characteristics to Equation (1). The full 
model is as follows: 
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where CORP_GOV are the lagged variables that control for corporate governance 
characteristics. These variables are: CEO tenure, board independence, and non-duality. 
 
4.4.3. The dependent variable: Earnings manipulation metrics 
The variable MANIPULATION in Equations (1) and (2) is separately estimated for 
income smoothing, discretionary accruals, and real activities manipulation. 
Income smoothing is measured by the ratio of firm i’s standard deviation of net 
income before extraordinary items (annual Compustat data item #18) divided by 
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beginning total assets (annual Compustat data item #6), to its standard deviation of 
cash flows from operations (annual Compustat data item #308) divided by beginning 
total assets (annual Compustat data item #6) (Francis et al., 2004) over rolling firm-
specific three-year windows. According to this measure (IS), the smaller the ratio, the 
greater the income smoothing. To ease the interpretation, we use for our models the 
reciprocal of this measure (R_IS). 
The proxy for discretionary accruals (DA) is based on the discretionary-accrual 
model introduced by Jones (1991). According to this model, total accruals are 
estimated as follows: 
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where i indicates the firm, t the year, TA represents total accruals, calculated as the 
difference between net income before extraordinary items and cash flows from 
operations (annual Compustat data item #18 – annual Compustat data item #308), A 
are total assets (annual Compustat data item #6), ∆REV is the change in net sales 
(annual Compustat data item #12), and PPE is gross property, plant and equipment 
(annual Compustat data item #7). The estimation is run for all firms in each industry 
through its 2-digit SIC code and for each year t. In our model, we use the absolute 
value of the residuals (ABS_DA), which represent the firm-specific discretionary 
portion of total accruals. 
Finally, our proxy of real activities manipulation is a measure of sales 
manipulation. Following Dechow et al. (1998) and Roychowdhury (2006), normal 
cash flow from operations can be expressed as a linear function of sales and changes 
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in sales in the current period. The model can be then estimated through the following 
cross-sectional regression: 
 
it
ti
tiit
ti
it
titi
it
A
SS
A
S
AA
CFO
εββαα +





 −
+







+







+=
−
−
−−− 1,
1,
2
1,
1
1,
10
1,
1
,   (4) 
 
where CFO is cash flow from operations (Compustat data item #308), A is total assets 
(annual Compustat data item #6), and S is sales (annual Compustat data item #12). 
This model is estimated for each year t and for every industry classified by its 2-digit 
SIC code. Our measure of real activities manipulation (RAM) is the abnormal CFOs, 
which are calculated as the difference between the actual values and those from 
equation (4). That is, our proxy for real activities manipulation (RAM) is the residuals 
from Equation (4). 
According to Roychowdhury (2006), firms that attempt to temporarily increase 
sales volume, for example by offering more lenient credit terms, present CFOs that are 
unusually lower than the rest of the firms. This would lead to negative values of RAM, 
that is, to observed CFOs that are lower than predicted by the model. Given this, 
smaller values of RAM mean that CEOs engage in real activities manipulation more. 
To ease the interpretation, we use in our models the inverted sign of RAM (I_RAM), so 
that our proxy for the manipulation of real activities is increasing with the level of 
manipulation. 
The residuals from Equation (4) can also be capturing the effects of the 
manipulation of discretionary expenses. Thus, we attempt to disentangle the effects of 
sales manipulation on CFOs from those of discretionary expenses manipulation. 
Reducing in an opportunistic way discretionary expenses has a positive effect on 
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current CFOs, possibly at the expense of future cash flows. In Equation (4), this 
opportunistic decrease in discretionary expenses contributes to observed CFOs being 
higher than the estimation, leading to positive residuals. To avoid capturing these two 
opposite effects that sales manipulation and discretionary expenses manipulation have 
on CFOs, we first compute discretionary expenses as the sum of advertising expenses 
(annual Compustat data item #45), R&D expenses (annual Compustat data item #46), 
and selling, general and administrative (SG&A) expenses (annual Compustat data 
item #189). If SG&A expenses are available, advertising and R&D expenses are set 
equal to zero if they are missing (Cohen et al, 2008). We consider SG&A expenses as 
a discretionary expenditure because we assume that this item mainly includes 
discretionary expenses, such as employee training, maintenance and travel, that 
generate cash outflows (Roychowdhury, 2006).  
We then compute the medians by year and by sector of the discretionary 
expenses scaled by beginning total assets and then calculate the difference between 
these medians and the discretionary expenses scaled by beginning total assets of each 
firm-year observation. We then add this difference to CFOs scaled by beginning total 
assets and rerun Equation (4). In this way, the residuals identify sales manipulation 
without considering the increasing effects that the manipulation of discretionary 
expenses has on CFOs. As in I_RAM, we follow the interpretation according to which 
firms with negative abnormal CFOs are those that engage in sales manipulation. To 
ease the interpretation, we multiply the residuals by minus one. This modified version 
of the model of Roychowdhury (2006) represents our second proxy of real activities 
manipulation (M_RAM). 
 
4.4.4. Compensation mechanisms metrics 
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The compensation mechanisms that we consider are base salaries, unexercisable and 
exercisable unexercised options, annual bonuses, long-term incentives, restricted stock 
grants and stock holdings. Each compensation mechanism is scaled by the sum of all the 
mechanisms listed above. We measure each mechanism as follows. 
Base salaries are represented by the dollar value of the base salary earned by the 
CEO during the fiscal year. Annual bonuses are computed as the dollar value of bonuses 
earned by the CEO during the fiscal year. Long-term incentives are calculated as the 
amount paid to the CEO under the company’s long term incentive plans, which take into 
account a period of more than one year. Options, equity and restricted stocks are 
computed, in a first stage, by considering the sum between the aggregate number of 
unexercised options held by the CEOs at fiscal year that were not yet vested, and the 
aggregate number of unexercised options held by executives at fiscal year end that were 
vested, the number of shares owned by CEOs, and the aggregate shares of restricted stock 
held by the CEOs as of fiscal year end. Following Bergstresser and Philippon (2006), we 
multiply, in a second stage, the number of options, shares, and restricted stock, by the 
share price. 
 
4.4.5. Control variables 
Earnings manipulation is partly determined by factors different from compensation 
mechanisms. For this reason, we include in our models several control variables. 
Firms are likely to engage in earnings manipulation to control for debt contracting 
issues (DeFond and Jimbalvo, 1994; Minton and Schrand, 1999). To take into account 
firms’ financial structure, we use leverage, computed as the ratio of total liabilities to total 
assets. According to Kothari, Leone and Wasley (2005), accounting manipulation is 
misspecified when firms’ performance is not considered. We thus include ROA, measured 
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as the ratio of income before extraordinary items to beginning total assets. Growth 
opportunities incentivize firms to manipulate earnings because earnings surprises are 
perceived in a special negative way from analysts for this kind of companies (Graham et 
al., 2005; Skinner and Sloan, 2002). We measure growth opportunities through the book-
to-market ratio. Larger firms face more political costs (Watts and Zimmermann, 1990) and 
are likely to manipulate earnings to reduce undesired visibility. We measure firm size 
through the logarithm of total assets. Finally, riskier firms are expected to manipulate 
earnings more in order to cover their real risk. We proxy for risk by computing the 
standard deviation of CFO over three-year rolling windows. 
As explained in the “Research design” Section, we include in Equation (2) other 
control variables that describe corporate governance characteristics. 
a) CEO tenure: CEO tenure is expected to affect compensation mechanisms. Older 
and younger CEOs are more likely to exacerbate the agency problem (Dechow and 
Sloan, 1991; Hirshleifer, 1993), as the oldest ones tend to maximize their wealth 
before retirement, and the youngest ones tend to focus on short-term goals to build 
up their reputation. CEOs that are neither among the younger nor among the older 
ones are expected to have fewer conflicts. The relation between CEO tenure and 
compensation mechanisms is then likely to be concave and the sign is uncertain. 
With respect to the association between CEO tenure and earnings manipulation, 
previous literature (Fredrickson et al. 1988) observed that the early vulnerability 
CEOs are subject to corresponds to their first three year, or less, in the firm. We 
then expect that CEOs act more in the interest of shareholders during their first 
years in the firm, and that the agency cost increases in later years. We can then 
argue that the longer the CEO tenure, the higher the earnings manipulation. 
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b) Board independence: Effective monitoring reduces the need for incentive 
alignment (Ryan and Wiggins III, 2001) and the manipulation of earnings (Klein, 
2002; Xie et al., 2003; Ahmed and Duellman, 2007; Garcia Lara et al., 2009). We 
measure board independence as the ratio of the number of executives that are not 
members of the board, to the total number of executives. 
c) CEOs’ non-duality: The separation between CEO and chair of the board reduces 
CEO’s opportunistic behaviour (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Ryan and Wiggins III, 
2001). Non-duality implies closer monitoring of executives. For this reason, it is 
likely to reduce earnings manipulation and also the need of compensation 
mechanisms to align CEOs’ and shareholders’ interests (Ryan and Wiggins III, 
2001). We measure non-duality through a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 
if the same person does not hold both the CEO and the chairman positions, and 0 
otherwise. 
 
4.5. Results 
4.5.1. Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics for manipulation proxies and for compensation 
mechanisms. R_IS has a mean of 2.1654, indicating that, on average, the variability in net 
income is greater than the variability in operating cash flows. Its median is equal to 
1.3344, which means that the variable is skewed right. R_IS is the reciprocal of the ratio 
between the variability of the standard deviation of net income before extraordinary items 
divided by beginning total assets, and the standard deviation of cash flow from operations 
divided by beginning total assets (IS). The mean of IS is equal to 1.1666, and its median is 
equal to 0.7494. Both mean and medians fit well with previous literature (Zarowin, 2002). 
The absolute value of discretionary accruals (ABS_DA) is 0.0460. This value is greater 
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than the mean of the signed discretionary accruals (DA), which is equal to 0.0023. The 
difference between the signed and the absolute values is explained by the fact that, by 
taking absolute values, the mean shifts to the right. The real activities manipulation proxy 
(I_RAM), calculated as the inverted sign of the sales manipulation proxy (RAM), has a 
mean close to zero (-0.0037), which is consistent with previous literature (Roychowdhury, 
2006). With respect to compensation mechanisms, options and shares are largely used, 
whilst long-term incentives are adopted by few firms. In terms of values, stock options 
have the greatest mean (0.5349) and median (0.6062), followed by equity stocks, which 
have a mean of 0.3661 and a median of 0.2520. Long-term incentives report the smallest 
values of the mean (0.0040). The greater use of stock options and equity stock, and the 
little presence of long-term incentives, is also confirmed by computing the percentages of 
observations that report a value greater than zero for each compensation mechanism. Only 
the 12.10% of observations in the sample provides to CEOs long-term incentives with a 
value greater than zero. Option values are greater than zero in the 92.90% of observations, 
and equity stock values have a percentage equal to 97.50%. Finally, 78.81% of 
observations have annual bonus values greater than zero, and 29.44% of the total has 
restricted stock grant values greater than zero. 
Table 3 reports pairwise Spearman (below the diagonal) and Pearson (above the 
diagonal) correlations for manipulation proxies. The correlation between the absolute 
values of discretionary accruals and the inverse of the adjusted sales manipulation is 
significantly positive. According to Roychowdhury (2006), this can be for two reasons. 
First, firms engaging in accounting manipulation also engage in real activities 
manipulation Second, some manipulation strategies, such as overproduction, have a 
positive effect on accruals, but a negative effect on cash flow from operations. The 
correlation between real activities manipulation and stock options is negative and not 
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significant in the case of I_RAM, and it is positive and significant for M_RAM. Most of the 
correlations between M_RAM and the rest of compensation mechanisms are negative and 
significant. The correlation between stock options and equity shares is high in both the 
Spearman and the Pearson correlations. This implies a possible multicollinearity problem, 
confirmed by a Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) equal to 17.05 for equity shares, and to 
16.44 for stock options. However, multicollinearity does not represent a problem for our 
analysis, as it has the effect of decreasing the probability that a coefficient is significant 
(Maddala, 2001). If the regression coefficients are significant, high correlation between 
independent variables should not be concerned. 
 
4.5.2. Determinants of earnings manipulation 
Results from Equation (1) are reported in Table 4. The Hausman test confirms that the 
fixed effect model is more appropriate than the random effect. 
Stock options are positively and significantly associated with discretionary accruals.  
The relation between stock options and the variable I_RAM is not significant. However, if 
we consider M_RAM as a proxy for real activities manipulation, the association becomes 
positive and significant. Therefore, hypothesis H1 is confirmed for both discretionary 
accruals and real activities manipulation, if M_RAM is taken into account. The positive 
sign obtained in R_IS can be explained by arguing that the positive effect on CEO’s wealth 
from an increase in option value through smoother earnings is greater than the one 
generated by an increase of the option value due to stock price volatility. Annual bonuses 
and long-term incentives have significant associations with discretionary accruals. In this 
case, the relations are positive. Hypothesis H2 is then partially confirmed, whilst 
hypothesis H3 is not confirmed, as the relation between long-term incentives and 
discretionary accruals was expected to be negative. Equity stock is positively associated 
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both with income smoothing and with discretionary accruals, as well as with real activities 
manipulation. The relation between equity stock and real activities manipulation is 
positive and significant if both I_RAM and M_RAM are used. Thus, hypothesis H4 is 
supported in the case of income smoothing and discretionary accruals, but not in the case 
of real activities manipulation. Finally, restricted stock grants do not have significant 
relations with any of the manipulation proxies. 
Table 5 reports results from Equation (2), where both unobservable and observable 
heterogeneity are taken into account. Also for this model, the Hausman test rejects the null 
hypothesis, suggesting that the fixed effect is more appropriate than the random effects. 
Stock options are positively associated both with discretionary accruals and with real 
activities manipulation, in the case in which the proxy M_RAM is used. Also, the 
association between stock options and income smoothing is positive and significant, 
meaning that the positive effects of smoothing incomes on stock options value are 
perceived by CEOs as greater than the negative effects. Annual bonuses and long-term 
incentives have significant associations only with discretionary accruals. The positive 
relation between annual bonuses and discretionary accruals partially supports hypothesis 
H2, whilst the positive association between long-term incentives and discretionary 
accruals do not confirms the expectations in hypothesis H3. Equity stock is positively 
associated with both income smoothing and discretionary accruals. Its association with real 
activities manipulation is positive and significant for I_RAM, and positive but not 
significant for M_RAM. Finally, restricted stock grants do not report any significant 
association. 
With regards to observable firms’ characteristics related to corporate governance, we 
observe that the relation between board independence and the absolute value of 
discretionary accruals is negative and significant, confirming the findings of previous 
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literature (Klein, 2002; Xie et al., 2003; Ahmed and Duellman, 2007; Garcia Lara et al., 
2009). The association between board independence and real activities manipulation is not 
significant neither for I_RAM nor for M_RAM. Finally, non-duality is significantly and 
negatively related to both R_IS and ABS_DA, but positively related to M_RAM. 
The hypotheses about the associations between compensation mechanisms and 
earnings manipulation tools are generally supported when corporate governance 
characteristics are included in the model. Some of the corporate governance characteristics 
that normally reduce discretionary accruals (i.e., board independence and non-duality) do 
not avoid the positive relationship between some compensation mechanisms (i.e., stock 
options) and real activities manipulation. Corporate governance characteristics reduce the 
problem of accounting manipulation but increase the one of real activities manipulation. 
 
4.5.3. Sensitivity checks 
Results presented in Table 5 are generally robust to alternative measures of earnings 
manipulation proxies. We alternatively measure income smoothing as the correlation 
between changes in accounting accruals and changes in operating cash flows (Leuz et al., 
2003). To calculate this, we use rolling firm-specific three-year windows. The expected 
sign of this correlation is negative (Dechow, 1994), and larger magnitudes of the negative 
correlation indicate smoothing of reported earnings that does not reflect the actual 
economic performance (Leuz et al., 2003). To ease the interpretation of our second proxy 
of income smoothing, we multiply the correlation by (-1), so that the greater the value, the 
smoother the income. By using this proxy in Equation (2) instead of R_IS, results are 
similar. The only difference with respect to the results obtained by using R_IS is 
represented by the association between income smoothing and stock options, which do not 
have a significant coefficient. As an alternative proxy of discretionary accruals, we use the 
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modified Jones model (Dechow et al., 1995). The only difference with the Jones model is 
that changes in revenues in Equation (3) are adjusted for the change in accounting 
receivable in the event period. Also for this proxy, we consider the absolute values of the 
residuals. By using this proxy as the dependent variable in Equation (2), results remain 
substantially the same. 
To control for aggregate fluctuations, we include year dummies in Equation (2). 
Results generally remain stable. The only difference is given by the association between 
restricted stock grants and discretionary accruals, which is positive and significant at the 
10% level. 
 
4.6. Summary and conclusions 
By analyzing the impact of a broad set of compensation mechanisms on alternative 
forms of manipulation, the paper sheds light on the undesired impacts that CEO’s 
compensation mechanisms have not only on accounting numbers, but also on real 
activities and, as a consequence, on future firms’ value. Results show that compensation 
mechanisms such as stock options, instead of reducing the agency problem by aligning the 
interests of CEOs to those of shareholders, tend to amplify it by affecting both accounting 
quality and efficient operational practices. Annual bonuses and long-term incentives are 
likely to lead managers to manipulate accounting numbers through discretionary accruals. 
CEOs with greater percentages of annual bonuses and long-term incentives over their total 
compensation are more interested in short-term objectives. However, managers are 
expected to achieve them by manipulating accounting numbers, rather than real activities. 
In this way, they temporarily increase earnings without directly affecting future firms’ 
value and, consequently, managers’ wealth. Equity stocks are positively associated with 
both income smoothing and discretionary accruals. The relation between equity stocks and 
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real activities manipulation is spurious, as it is positive and significant when unobservable 
firms’ characteristics are considered, and not significant when also observable 
characteristics are taken into account. Finally, restricted stock grants do not have any 
relation with the manipulation proxies. 
We find evidence that compensation mechanisms, which are introduced to minimize 
the agency problem, can exacerbate it in peculiar situations. Compensation mechanisms 
can lead CEOs to distort firms’ performance not only through accounting manipulation, 
but also through real activities manipulation. As a consequence, an increase in 
performance-based compensation implies not only a greater use of discretionary accruals, 
but also the manipulation of operational activities that lead to a decrease of long-term firm 
value. We do not believe that compensation mechanisms necessarily destroy value, but we 
argue that the mix of compensation mechanisms provided to CEOs needs to be carefully 
structured so that their drawbacks in terms of earnings manipulation do not increase the 
agency costs, rather than decrease them. 
Further research can explore the moderating roles of corporate governance 
characteristics on the associations between compensation mechanisms and earnings 
manipulation tools. Stronger corporate governance characteristics can affect CEOs’ 
decision about which earnings manipulation tool can be used to achieve their personal 
goals. In fact, stronger corporate governance, which is expected to decrease the agency 
problem, may lead managers to prefer real activities manipulation to accounting 
manipulation, as the distortion of operational activities is more difficult to be detected. In 
this case, corporate governance can modify CEOs’ preferences about the earnings 
manipulation tools to maximize their wealth, and can further exacerbate the conflict of 
interests between managers and shareholders. 
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Table 1 – Expected associations between compensation mechanisms and earnings 
manipulation tools 
 
 
 Income smoothing Discretionary accruals Real activities 
manipulation 
Stock options ? + + 
Annual bonuses + + - 
Long-term incentives ? - - 
Equity stocks + + - 
Restricted stock grants ? ? ? 
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Table 2 – Descriptive statistics 
Variables 25th percentile Mean Median 75th percentile Standard deviation 
IS 0.3972 1.1666 0.7494 1.3809 1.3386 
R_IS 0.7242 2.1654 1.3344 2.5178 2.5425 
DA -0.0271 0.0023 0.0022 0.0354 0.0660 
ABS_DA 0.0131 0.0460 0.0316 0.0619 0.0473 
RAM -0.0378 0.0037 0.0003 0.0438 0.0764 
I_RAM -0.0438 -0.0037 -0.0003 0.0378 0.0764 
M_RAM -0.1048 -0.0063 -0.0065 0.0785 0.1709 
Stock options 0.2733 0.5349 0.6062 0.8026 0.3102 
Bonus 0.0012 0.0234 0.0122 0.0287 0.0419 
Long-term 
incentives 0 0.0040 0 0 0.0195 
Equity shares 0.1003 0.3661 0.2520 0.6109 0.3192 
Restricted 
stock grants 0 0.0254 0 0.0146 0.0624 
 
 
IS is income smoothing, computed as the ratio of firm i’s standard deviation of net income before 
extraordinary items divided by beginning total assets, to its standard deviation of cash flow from operations 
divided by beginning total assets, calculated over rolling three-year windows; R_IS is the reciprocal of IS; 
DA is accounting manipulation, measured by the discretionary accruals computed as in the Jones model; 
ABS_DA is the absolute value of DA; RAM is real activities manipulation, measured as the residuals of the 
model of Roychowdhury; I_RAM is the inverted sign of RAM; M_RAM is the modified version of the model 
of Roychowdhury for sales manipulation, in which the CFOs scaled by beginning total assets used to run the 
model are equal to the sum between the original CFOs scaled by beginning total assets, and the difference 
between the median by year and by sector of discretionary expenses scaled by beginning total assets and 
discretionary expenses scaled by beginning total assets of each firm-year observation; Stock options is the 
product of share price with the sum of the aggregate number of unexercised unexercisable options and the 
aggregate number of unexercised exercisable options; Bonus is the dollar value of annual bonus earned 
during fiscal year; Long-term incentives is the dollar value of long-term incentives earned during fiscal year; 
Equity shares is the product of share price with the number of shares earned by CEOs; Restricted stock 
grants is the product of share price with the aggregate number of shares of restricted stock held by CEOs as 
of fiscal year end. 
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Table 3 – Correlation matrix 
 R_IS ABS_DA I_RAM M_RAM Stock 
options Bonus 
Long-term 
incentives 
Equity 
shares 
Restricted 
stock 
grants 
ROA Total 
assets (ln) 
R_IS 1 -0.0191 -0.0090 -0.0532 -0.0662 0.0210 0.0062 0.0737 -0.0062 0.1536 0.0113 
ABS_DA -0.0465 1 0.0509 0.0530 0.0138 -0.0101 -0.0327 -0.0101 -0.0615 -0.1841 -0.1852 
I_RAM -0.0369 0.0462 1 0.3190 -0.0120 0.0288 0.0013 -0.0298 0.0293 -0.4417 -0.0245 
M_RAM -0.0704 0.0303 0.3017 1 0.0697 -0.0227 -0.0112 -0.0661 -0.0232 -0.1632 -0.0487 
Stock 
options -0.0913 0.0261 -0.0165 0.0685 1 -0.0310 -0.0218 -0.9155 -0.1084 -0.0638 0.1850 
Bonus 0.0767 -0.0565 -0.0138 -0.0329 0.1550 1 0.1199 -0.2109 0.0472 -0.0219 -0.0057 
Long-term 
incentives 0.0435 -0.0786 -0.0145 -0.0234 0.0349 0.1506 1 -0.0677 0.0423 0.0071 0.1275 
Equity 
shares 0.1080 -0.0245 -0.0325 -0.0735 -0.8990 -0.2798 -0.0596 1 -0.1001 0.1366 -0.1671 
Restricted 
stock grants 0.0056 -0.0755 0.0338 -0.0152 -0.0461 0.1603 0.1424 -0.0624 1 -0.0012 0.1801 
ROA 0.2195 -0.0582 -0.4265 -0.1183 -0.0583 0.1032 0.0516 0.1408 -0.0145 1 0.0947 
Total assets 
(ln) 0.0264 -0.1704 -0.0183 -0.0437 0.1703 0.1103 0.2557 -0.1299 0.3010 -0.0014 1 
 
 
Correlations in bold are significant at the 1% level. 
 
Pairwise Spearman (below the diagonal) and Pearson (above the diagonal) correlations for manipulation proxies. R_IS is the reciprocal of the proxy of income smoothing, 
computed as the reciprocal of the ratio of firm i’s standard deviation of net income before extraordinary items divided by beginning total assets, to its standard deviation of 
cash flow from operations divided by beginning total assets, calculated over rolling three-year windows; ABS_DA is the absolute value of the accounting manipulation proxy, 
measured by the discretionary accruals computed as in the Jones model; I_RAM is the inverted sign of the real activities manipulation proxy, measured through the residuals of 
the model of Roychowdhury. M_RAM is the modified version of the model of Roychowdhury for sales manipulation, in which the CFOs scaled by beginning total assets used 
to run the model are equal to the sum between the original CFOs scaled by beginning total assets, and the difference between the median by year and by sector of discretionary 
expenses scaled by beginning total assets and discretionary expenses scaled by beginning total assets of each firm-year observation. Stock options is the product of share price 
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with the sum of the aggregate number of unexercised unexercisable options and the aggregate number of unexercised exercisable options; Bonus is the dollar value of annual 
bonus earned during fiscal year; Long-term incentives is the dollar value of long-term incentives earned during fiscal year; Equity shares is the product of share price with the 
number of shares earned by CEOs; Restricted stock grants is the product of share price with the aggregate number of shares of restricted stock held by CEOs as of fiscal year 
end; Leverage is the ratio between total liabilities and total assets; ROA is the ratio between income before extraordinary assets and beginning total assets; Total assets (ln) is 
the natural logarithm of total assets; 
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Table 4 – The impact of compensation mechanisms on manipulation proxies 
 
 Accounting manipulation  Real activities manipulation 
 Income smoothing  Discretionary accruals  Sales manipulation 
 
Expected 
sign R_IS  
Expected 
sign ABS_DA  
Expected 
sign I_RAM M_RAM 
Intercept  0.2319   0.0457***   -0.0306*** -0.0694*** 
  (0.54)   (5.64)   (2.80) (3.59) 
Stock options
 t ? 0.7931**  + 0.0149**  + 0.0097 0.0306** 
  (2.45)   (2.45)   (1.18) (2.11) 
Bonus
 t + 0.4428  + 0.0312**  - -0.0116 0.0095 
  (0.61)   (2.29)   (0.63) (0.29) 
Long-term 
incentives
 t ? 0.3720  - 0.0441**  - -0.0255 0.0344 
  (0.31)   (1.97)   (0.84) (0.64) 
Equity stock
 t + 0.9660***  + 0.0183***  - 0.0150* 0.0280* 
  (3.01)   (3.04)   (1.85) (1.95) 
Restricted 
stock
 t ? 0.7408  ? 0.0110  ? 0.0108 0.0298 
  (1.42)   (1.13)   (0.81) (1.27) 
Leverage
 t  -0.6590***   0.0076**   0.0257*** 0.0471*** 
  (3.63)   (2.23)   (5.61) (5.80) 
ROA
 t  3.4535***   -0.0845***   -0.2618*** -0.2809*** 
  (11.43)   (14.92)   (34.27) (20.77) 
Book-to-
Market
 t  -0.0025   -0.0002*   0.0001 0.0001 
  (0.45)   (1.92)   (0.71) (0.49) 
Total assets 
(ln)
 t  0.0828*   -0.0031***   0.0029** 0.0042** 
  (1.80)   (3.65)   (2.47) (2.03) 
CFO 
(stand.dev.)
 t  15.7786***   0.1642***   -0.0622*** -0.0654** 
  (23.77)   (13.20)   (3.70) (2.20) 
Hausman test  102.25 
 
 52.01   107.36 42.87 
Effects  
Fixed effect 
model 
 
 
Fixed effect 
model 
 
 
Fixed effect 
model 
Fixed effect 
model 
R2  0.0598   0.0420   0.1150 0.0500 
Observations  13,364   13,364   13,364 13,364 
 
*** Significant at the 1% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, * Significant at the 10% level. 
 
Table 4 reports the results from the following panel data fixed effect model, which controls for 
unobservable heterogeneity: 
itiitjjitkkit uCONTROLSONCOMPENSATIONMANIPULATI '',, εββα ++Σ+Σ+=  
R_IS is the reciprocal of the proxy for income smoothing, computed as the reciprocal of the ratio of firm 
i’s standard deviation of net income before extraordinary items divided by beginning total assets, to its 
standard deviation of cash flow from operations divided by beginning total assets, calculated over rolling 
three-year windows; ABS_DA is the absolute value of the accounting manipulation proxy, measured by the 
discretionary accruals computed as in the Jones model; I_RAM is the inverted sign of the real activities 
manipulation proxy, measured as the residuals of the model of Roychowdhury; M_RAM is the modified 
version of the model of Roychowdhury for sales manipulation, in which the CFOs scaled by beginning 
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total assets used to run the model are equal to the sum between the original CFOs scaled by beginning 
total assets, and the difference between the median by year and by sector of discretionary expenses scaled 
by beginning total assets and discretionary expenses scaled by beginning total assets of each firm-year 
observation; Stock options is the product of share price with the sum of the aggregate number of 
unexercised unexercisable options and the aggregate number of unexercised exercisable options; Bonus is 
the dollar value of annual bonus earned during fiscal year; Long-term incentives is the dollar value of 
long-term incentives earned during fiscal year; Equity shares is the product of share price with the number 
of shares earned by CEOs; Restricted stock grants is the product of share price with the aggregate number 
of shares of restricted stock held by CEOs as of fiscal year end; Leverage is the ratio between total 
liabilities and total assets; ROA is the ratio between income before extraordinary assets and beginning 
total assets; Book-to-market is the ratio of book value of assets to the market value of equity; Total assets 
(ln) is the natural logarithm of total assets; CFO (stand.dev) is the standard deviation of operating cash 
flows computed by using rolling firm-specific three-year windows. 
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Table 5 - The impact of compensation mechanisms on manipulation proxies by 
using lagged variables related to corporate governance characteristics 
 
 Accounting manipulation  Real activities manipulation 
 Income smoothing  Discretionary accruals  Sales manipulation 
 
Expected 
sign R_IS  
Expected 
sign ABS_DA  
Expected 
sign I_RAM M_RAM 
Intercept  0.1616   0.0531***   -0.0491*** -0.0751*** 
  (0.31)   (5.37)   (3.70) (3.25) 
Stock options
 t ? 0.7467**  + 0.0172**  + 0.0106 0.0352** 
  (2.05)   (2.48)   (1.15) (2.18) 
Bonus
 t + -0.1487  + 0.0379**  - -0.0179 -0.0034 
  (0.18)   (2.48)   (0.87) (0.10) 
Long-term 
incentives
 t ? -0.3594  - 0.0462*  - -0.0086 0.0610 
  (0.29)   (1.95)   (0.27) (1.10) 
Equity stock
 t + 0.7182**  + 0.0191***  - 0.0158* 0.0255 
  (1.98)   (2.77)   (1.71) (1.59) 
Restricted stock
 t ? 0.6484  ? 0.0133  ? 0.0244 0.0422 
  (1.11)   (1.20)   (1.64) (1.62) 
CEO tenure
 t-1  0.0016   -0.0001   -0.0002 0.0001 
  (0.29)   (1.14)   (1.50) (0.39) 
Board 
independence
 t-1  0.1035   -0.0071*   0.0073 0.0071 
  (0.49)   (1.78)   (1.37) (0.76) 
Non-duality
 t-1  -0.1566**   -0.0048***   -0.0007 0.0078** 
  (2.16)   (3.49)   (0.39) (2.43) 
Leverage
 t  -0.9043***   0.0083**   0.0302*** 0.0616*** 
  (4.16)   (2.02)   (5.45) (6.37) 
ROA
 t  3.2955***   -0.0948***   -0.2796*** -0.2684*** 
  (9.54)   (14.46)   (31.76) (17.51) 
Book-to-Market
 
t  -0.0033   -0.0002   0.0001 0.0001 
  (0.59)   (1.47)   (0.80) (0.49) 
Total assets (ln)
 t  0.1195**   -0.0034***   0.0045*** 0.0021 
  (2.10)   (3.14)   (3.07) (0.82) 
CFO 
(stand.dev.)
 t  16.2606***   0.1630***   -0.0725*** -0.0419 
  (21.58)   (11.39)   (3.77) (1.25) 
Hausman test  118.06   54.91   80.77 35.90 
Effects  Fixed effect 
model 
 
 
Fixed effect 
model 
 
 
Fixed effect 
model 
Fixed effect 
model 
R2  0.0621   0.0493   0.1304 0.0514 
Observations  10,468   10,468   10,468 10,468 
 
*** Significant at the 1% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, * Significant at the 10% level. 
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Table 5 reports the results from the following panel data fixed effect model, which controls for both 
unobservable and observable heterogeneity: 
 
itiitjjtiuuitkkit uCONTROLSGOVCORPONCOMPENSATIONMANIPULATI ''_ ,1,,, εβββα ++Σ+Σ++Σ+= −
 R_IS is the reciprocal of the proxy of income smoothing, computed as the reciprocal of the ratio of firm i’s 
standard deviation of net income before extraordinary items divided by beginning total assets, to its 
standard deviation of cash flow from operations divided by beginning total assets, calculated over rolling 
three-year windows; ABS_DA is the absolute value of the accounting manipulation proxy, measured by the 
discretionary accruals computed as in the Jones model; I_RAM is the inverted sign of the real activities 
manipulation proxy, measured through the residuals of the model of Roychowdhury; M_RAM is the 
modified version of the model of Roychowdhury for sales manipulation, in which the CFOs scaled by 
beginning total assets used to run the model are equal to the sum between the original CFOs scaled by 
beginning total assets, and the difference between the median by year and by sector of discretionary 
expenses scaled by beginning total assets and discretionary expenses scaled by beginning total assets of 
each firm-year observation; Stock options is the product of share price with the sum of the aggregate 
number of unexercised unexercisable options and the aggregate number of unexercised exercisable 
options; Bonus is the dollar value of annual bonus earned during fiscal year. Long-term incentives is the 
dollar value of long-term incentives earned during fiscal year; Equity shares is the product of share price 
with the number of shares earned by CEOs; Restricted stock grants is the product of share price with the 
aggregate number of shares of restricted stock held by CEOs as of fiscal year end; CEO tenure is the 
number of years in which executives served as CEOs for all or most of each fiscal year; Board 
independence is 1 minus the ratio of the number of executives serving as directors, to the total number of 
executives; Non-duality is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the same person does not hold 
both the CEO and the chairman positions, and 0 otherwise; Leverage is the ratio between total liabilities 
and total assets. ROA is the ratio between income before extraordinary assets and beginning total assets; 
Book-to-market is the ratio of book value of assets to the market value of equity; Total assets (ln) is the 
natural logarithm of total assets; CFO (stand.dev) is the standard deviation of operating cash flows 
computed by using rolling firm-specific three-year windows. 
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Chapter 5 – Conclusions 
 
The thesis is composed of three empirical essays about corporate governance and 
earnings management. In the first essay, “Overinvestment, subsequent earnings 
management, and CEO vulnerability”, results show that CEOs are likely to manipulate 
financial reporting information to cover investment inefficiencies through both the 
unexpected components of accruals and sales manipulation. Earnings management is 
generally more intensive if I consider investments that are more difficult to monitor, 
such as capital expenditures and R&D expenditures. In fact, earnings management is 
likely to be more effective in hiding investment inefficiencies if stakeholders cannot 
easily observe investment returns. Finally, results suggest that vulnerable CEOs are 
likely to overinvest to decrease their vulnerability in the future. Results from the second 
essay, titled “Entrenched managers’ usage of earnings management tools”, indicate that 
entrenchment is positively associated with income smoothing, and negatively associated 
with both discretionary accruals and real activities manipulation. Because entrenched 
CEOs engage in earnings management using methods that are less detrimental to firm 
value, I also show that entrenchment is positively related to subsequent operating 
performance. In the third essay, titled “Compensation mechanisms, accounting choice, 
and real activities manipulation”, empirical results show that compensation mechanisms 
that limit CEOs’ loss from stock price declines, such as stock options, lead managers to 
engage in accounting manipulation (i.e., income smoothing and discretionary accruals). 
CEOs rewarded with stock options also engage in real activities manipulation even at 
the expense of future cash flows, as stock options do not penalize managers as much as 
shareholders from a future decrease in firm value. CEOs with greater percentages of 
annual bonuses and long-term incentives over their total compensation engage in 
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discretionary accruals, rather than in real activities manipulation. In this way, they 
temporarily increase earnings without directly affecting future firms’ value and, 
consequently, managerial future wealth. Equity stocks are positively associated with 
both income smoothing and discretionary accruals to avoid a decrease of managerial 
welfare from a decline in stock price without affecting long-term firm value. 
Overall, the three essays have implications for both corporate governance and 
financial accounting literature. Although corporate governance literature observes that 
corporate governance mechanisms are designed to align the interests of managers to 
those of shareholders, authors should further consider the drawbacks of corporate 
governance in terms of earnings manipulation. I do not argue that corporate governance 
is always detrimental for firms, but that stakeholders should be careful in evaluating 
firms by observing corporate governance mechanisms. In fact, over the three essays, I 
show how corporate governance may further amplify the agency problem by leading 
CEOs to distort financial reporting information. For instance, managers acknowledging 
their vulnerability (caused by market capital pressures) may overinvest to reinforce their 
position and then use earnings management to mislead stakeholders. External corporate 
governance, such as takeovers and the market for corporate control, is typically expected 
to force managers to behave in the interest of shareholders. However, external corporate 
governance makes managers exposed to the pressure of capital markets and leads CEOs 
to focus on immediate results, rather than on long-term objectives, also by manipulating 
financial reporting information using methods that are detrimental to future firm value. 
Compensation mechanisms, initially considered as an incentive for managers to behave 
in the interest of shareholders, can lead managers to manipulate not only accounting 
numbers, but also normal operational activities. 
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My three essays have also implications for financial accounting literature. In 
particular, it could further explore how analysts and auditors interpret different ways 
that CEOs can use to manipulate financial reporting. In the three essays, I observe that 
income smoothing is likely to make earnings less informative, but it is also likely to 
have positive long-term effects on future firm value, such as a decrease in both cost of 
capital and cost of debt. I also report that, whilst the manipulation of accounting 
numbers has the main effect of reducing the quality of financial reporting information, 
real activities manipulation affects cash flow and, thus, future firm value. Future 
research could investigate whether analysts’ forecasts and auditors’ reports capture the 
methods used by CEOs to distort financial reporting information (i.e., income 
smoothing, discretionary accruals, and real activities manipulation), and how analysts 
and auditors evaluate the effects of each method. 
 
